This document is a compilation of all questions, justifications, and sources used to determine the 2021 Global Health Security Index scores for Jordan. For a category and indicator-level summary, please see the Country Profile for Jordan.

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Category 1: Preventing the emergence or release of pathogens with potential for international concern

1.1 ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE (AMR)

1.1.1 AMR surveillance, detection, and reporting

1.1.1a

Is there a national AMR plan for the surveillance, detection, and reporting of priority AMR pathogens?

Yes, there is evidence of an AMR plan, and it covers surveillance, detection, and reporting = 2, Yes, there is evidence of an AMR plan, but there is insufficient evidence that it covers surveillance, detection, and reporting = 1, No evidence of an AMR plan = 0

Current Year Score: 2

Jordan has a national AMR plan for the surveillance, detection, and reporting of priority AMR pathogens. The 'National Action Plan for Combating Antimicrobial Resistance in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2018-2022)' was published in 2018. It is accessible on the websites of the World Health Organization (WHO) Library of National Action Plans and the Jordan Ministry of Health. In October 2019, The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the UN and the Ministry of Agriculture conducted a workshop to discuss ways to better implement the plan. The plan covers surveillance, detection and reporting of priority AMR pathogens. The strategic objectives of the plan explicitly covered surveillance of priority AMR pathogens and implicitly alluded to the detection of such pathogens through prevention and control measures. Reporting is a cross-cutting component of several activities listed in the operational plan and the monitoring and evaluation strategy. [1, 2, 3] Additionally, the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, conducted in September 2016, confirmed that country has a national AMR plan approved by the government. The report also included a breakdown of the country's scores (out of five): mixed scores of two and three (i.e., limited and developed capacity) for surveillance, two (i.e., limited capacity) for AMR detection, and mixed scores of two and three (i.e., limited and developed capacity) for reporting. [4, 5]

1.1.1b

Is there a national laboratory/laboratory system which tests for priority AMR pathogens?

All 7 + 1 priority pathogens = 2 , Yes, but not all 7+1 pathogens = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

Jordan has a laboratory system that tests for only one priority Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) pathogen as defined by the World Health Organization (WHO). Produced in 2016, the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan mentioned that Jordan’s laboratory system performs tests for tuberculosis which is one of the 7+1 pathogens prioritized by WHO. While none of the other priority pathogens are mentioned in the report, tests for other diseases such as Brucella, cholera, Ebola, hepatitis, HIV, influenza and subtypes, MERS-CoV, polio, Rift Valley and West Nile exist. The tests are accessible by the country’s entire population through the public health system. [1,2] The ‘National Action Plan for Combating Antimicrobial Resistance in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2018-2022)’ does not provide insights on the country’s current laboratory system, yet it focuses on strengthening the laboratory capacity is among the main strategic objectives of Jordan’s national action plan to combat AMR. [3,4] The website of the Ministry of Health and the website of the Crisis Management Directorate of the Ministry of Health do not include information on Jordan’s laboratory systems that perform tests for tuberculosis. [5,6]


1.1.1c

Does the government conduct environmental detection or surveillance activities (e.g., in soil, waterways) for antimicrobial residues or AMR organisms?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

The government of Jordan conducts environmental detection and surveillance activities for residues or AMR organisms. According to the 2017/2018 report of the National Project for Monitoring the Quality of Water in Jordan, the Jordanian Ministry of Environment frequently detects and monitors waterways for AMR organisms. [1] The National Water Strategy 2016-2025 published on the Ministry of Water and Irrigation website, confirmed that Jordan is compliant with the World Health Organization (WHO) standards relevant to the microbiological indicators of the water provided to the Kingdom’s
entire population. This further suggests that surveillance activities of AMR in water exist. [2] The 2016 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, on the other hand, touched upon environmental monitoring and testing without specifically mentioning tests for antimicrobial residues or AMR organisms. [3] Also, the 'National Action Plan for Combating Antimicrobial Resistance in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2018-2022)' presented the Ministry of Environment as a key stakeholder without providing details about the tests that the Ministry performs. [4,5]

[1] Ministry of Environment. 2017-2018. "The National Project for Monitoring the Quality of Water in Jordan". [http://moenv.gov.jo/ebv4.0/root_storage/ar/eb_list_page/%D9%85%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%B5_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%86%D9%88%D9%A1A2017-2018.pdf]. Accessed 31 July 2020.

1.1.2 Antimicrobial control

1.1.2a Is there national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for humans? 
Yes = 2 , Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in enforcement = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that Jordan has national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for humans. According to the National Action Plan for Combating Antimicrobial Resistance In the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2018-2022), Jordan has regulations restricting the use of antibiotics without prescriptions, however these regulations are reportedly “weak and poorly enforced”. This Plan further emphasizes that the sale of antibiotics is not regulated despite having regulations in place, resulting in high rates of self-medication in the country. The Plan also highlights Jordan’s poor implementation of “pre-authorisation antimicrobial prescription forms and prescription guidelines” despite its many antimicrobial resistance (AMR) stewardship committees. Jordan has proposed the following measures to better control antibiotic use in the country: National AMR Containment and Use Policy and related strengthened regulatory frameworks, National Drug Regulatory Authority, revised essential medicines list and standard treatment guidelines with special reference to the use of antimicrobial agents, evidence-based guidelines for National Antimicrobial Stewardship Programme in human and animal health care, ambulatory and community settings as well as aquaculture and an AMU monitoring programme in humans and food animals, including residue testing in food products. [1] Further, the Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’ published in September 2016, lists inadequately enforced regulations for the monitoring and control of the use of antibiotics in both human and animal sectors as a key area for improvement for the country. [2] In December 2017, the Jordanian Food and Drug Administration (JFDA) distributed the “Circular on dispensing antibiotics” to public and private hospitals and pharmacies, stating that there is a national regulation requiring prescriptions for antibiotic human use in Jordan. However, there is no mention of a specific law/regulation in the circular. [3] This presence
of loosely regulated antibiotic usage is also noted in a research article published in 2019 by PLOS ONE (a peer-reviewed scientific journal). [4]


1.1.2b
Is there national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for animals?
Yes = 2 , Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in enforcement = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Jordan has regulations requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for animals. The regulations and legislations published on the Jordanian Veterinary Association website include general guidelines about veterinary medicine without indicating that prescriptions are required for antibiotic use for animals. [1] The 'National Action Plan for Combating Antimicrobial Resistance In the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2018-2022)', published on the websites of the World Health Organisation (WHO) Library of National Action Plans and the Ministry of Health, mentioned that legislative restrictions for antibiotics use are in place for animal growth only. According to the Plan "the current legislation that is restricting antibiotics for growth does not clearly specify that antimicrobial agents are prescription only veterinary medicine and that veterinary prescriptions are mentioned in the current legislation for prescribing poisonous chemical products only". [2,3] The 'Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Mission Report', published in January 2017, does not include information on antibiotic use for animals. [4] The website of the Ministry of Health and the website of the Ministry of Agriculture do not include information on this matter. [5,6]

1.2 ZOONOTIC DISEASE

1.2.1 National planning for zoonotic diseases/pathogens

1.2.1a
Is there national legislation, plans, or equivalent strategy documents on zoonotic disease?
Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

Jordan has functional mechanisms to respond to zoonotic diseases that amount to national zoonotic disease strategy. According to the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan report, completed in September 2016, the country has guidelines for zoonotic pathogens but not a national plan for zoonotic diseases. It conducts surveillance and control of several zoonotic pathogens, including brucellosis, MERS-CoV, cutaneous leishmaniasis, rabies, anthrax and avian influenza. [1] According to the same report, "the public health system reports zoonotic diseases through the Integrated Disease Surveillance System that has an immediate and a weekly reporting schedule." [1] Also, in 2016, a three-year project supported by USAID was launched in Jordan to develop early zoonotic warning system, which further suggests that responding to zoonotic diseases continue to be addressed on a national level in the country. [2] The national AMR action plan for 2018-2022, published on the World Health Organisation (WHO) Library of National Action Plans website and the Ministry of Health website, does not mention that Jordan has a zoonotic national law or strategy for surveillance and control. [3,4]


1.2.1b
Is there national legislation, plans or equivalent strategy document(s) which includes measures for risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events from animals to humans?
Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Jordan has national legislation, plans or equivalent strategy document(s) which includes measures for risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events from animals to humans. According to the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report for Jordan, completed in September 2016, zoonotic disease spillover is
deemed to be a national public health concern in Jordan especially with the refugee crisis that affected the country over the past few years. The report nonetheless, does not refer to any national legislation, plans or equivalent strategy document(s) which includes measures for risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events from animals to humans.


1.2.1c
Is there national legislation, plans, or guidelines that account for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens of public health concern?
Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

Jordan has national plan and guidelines that account for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens of public health control. Jordan's national surveillance and infection prevention and control guidelines published in early 2016 on the Ministry of Health website, outline details about surveillance and control strategies of multiple zoonotic pathogens of public health concern including (but not limited to) Poliomyelitis, Brucellosis, Rabies, MERS-CoV, Avian influenza, Ebola and Anthrax.


1.2.1d

Is there a department, agency, or similar unit dedicated to zoonotic disease that functions across ministries?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Jordan has a department, agency, or similar unit dedicated to zoonotic disease that functions across ministries and deals with human and animal health. The surveillance guidelines published in February 2016 on the website of the Ministry of Health (MoH) covers surveillance and control of pathogens relevant to human health only. The document mentioned that MoH divided the country into 21 zones with at least one centre in each to report on communicable diseases that affect human health. [1] The ‘Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’, completed in September 2016, mentioned that the national public health system in Jordan has a poorly established Integrated Disease Surveillance System for zoonotic diseases. The report does not mention any unit or similar structure designated for dealing with human and animal health across ministries. It only notes that zoonoses of greatest national public health concern are included in the national surveillance system as well as Disaster Risk Reduction Centre and the National Committee chaired by the Prime Minister. [2] Also, there is no mention of a unit or a similar mechanism neither on the website of the Jordanian Veterans Association nor the website of the Ministry of Agriculture. [3,4] The ‘National Action Plan for Combating Antimicrobial Resistance In the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2018-2022)’ does not include information on this matter. [5,6]

1.2.2 Surveillance systems for zoonotic diseases/pathogens

1.2.2a

Does the country have a national mechanism (either voluntary or mandatory) for owners of livestock to conduct and report on disease surveillance to a central government agency?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Jordan has a national mechanism for livestock owners to conduct and report on disease surveillance to a central government agency. According to the national AMR action plan for 2018-22, which is publicly available on the WHO Library of National Action Plans website and the Ministry of Health website, the national standards on livestock and plants in Jordan are minimal and poorly implemented. The plan does not include information on mechanisms for owners of livestock to report on disease surveillance. [1, 2] There is no information available on the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture websites indicating that there is a national mechanism in place for owners of livestock to report on disease. [3, 4] Also, Jordan does not have an OIE PVS evaluation report published on the World Organisation for Animal health (OIE) PVS evaluation reports website, and accordingly, the website does not provide information on such mechanism. [5]


1.2.2b

Is there legislation and/or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of information generated through surveillance activities for animals (for owners)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that there are laws and/or guidelines that safeguard the confidentiality of information generated through surveillance activities for animals (for owners) in Jordan. The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report for the Kingdom of Jordan, completed in September 2016, did not include guidance on confidentiality of surveillance information. [1] The national AMR action plan for 2018-22, which is published on the websites of WHO Library of National Action Plans and the Ministry of Health does not provide information regarding this either. [2,3] The websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, and the Jordanian Veterinary Association do not have any guidelines related to confidentiality of information. [4, 5, 6]

1.2.2c

Does the country conduct surveillance of zoonotic disease in wildlife (e.g., wild animals, insects, other disease vectors)?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0


1.2.3 International reporting of animal disease outbreaks

1.2.3a
Has the country submitted a report to OIE on the incidence of human cases of zoonotic disease for the last calendar year?
Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2019

OIE WAHIS database

1.2.4 Animal health workforce

1.2.4a
Number of veterinarians per 100,000 people
Input number

Current Year Score: 11.38

2017

OIE WAHIS database

1.2.4b
Number of veterinary para-professionals per 100,000 people
Input number

Current Year Score: 6.37

2017

OIE WAHIS database

1.2.5 Private sector and zoonotic

1.2.5a
Does the national plan on zoonotic disease or other legislation, regulations, or plans include mechanisms for working with the private sector in controlling or responding to zoonoses?
Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Jordan has a national law or plan on zoonotic disease. The surveillance guidelines published in early 2016 on the Ministry of Health website, include a communication plan that divides the country into 21 zones with one main surveillance centre in each zone serving as a focal point ensuring efficient two-way communication between the private and public health sectors about the control of zoonoses spread, response mechanisms and monitoring of cases in each zone and the wider country. However, the guidelines do not mention any legislation, regulations, or plans for
working with the private sector in the actual monitoring and control processes of zoonotic disease. [1]

Although the 'Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan', completed in September 2016, states that there is communication co-ordination with the private sector, the report does not specify if it includes zoonotic diseases or not. [2]

The National Action Plan for Combating Antimicrobial Resistance In the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2018-2022), published on the WHO Library of National Action Plans website and the Ministry of Health website, highlighted a gaps in formal connection between the public and private sectors when it comes to the animal sector. The plan, nonetheless, does not provide information relevant to working with the private sector in monitoring, controlling or responding to zoonotic diseases. [3,4]

Jordan does not have an OIE PVS evaluation report on the website of the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) PVS evaluation, and accordingly there is no relevant information available. [5]

The websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, and the Jordanian Veterinary Association do not provide supporting evidence. [6, 7, 8]


1.3 BIOSECURITY

1.3.1 Whole-of- government biosecurity systems

1.3.1a

Does the country have in place a record, updated within the past five years, of the facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed, including details on inventories and inventory management systems of those facilities?
Yes = 1 , No = 0
Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence indicating that Jordan has a record updated in the past five years of the facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed. Both, the Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan completed in 2016 and the National Strategy for Health Sector in Jordan (2015-2019), do not mention any information about such a record in Jordan. [1, 2] The websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Interior do not have any information on this regard either. [3,4,5] The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database for Jordan does not include information on this matter. [6] Although Jordan submits UN Biological Weapons Convention Confidence Building Measures almost every year, the report is not accessible, and it remains unknown if it provides information on the availability of the records. [7]


1.3.1b

Does the country have in place legislation and/or regulations related to biosecurity which address requirements such as physical containment, operation practices, failure reporting systems, and/or cybersecurity of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed?
Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Jordan has legislation and/or regulations related to biosecurity which address requirements such as physical containment, operation practices, failure reporting systems and/or cybersecurity of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed. Although Jordan has biosecurity guidelines that address physical containment, operation practices and cybersecurity, the country does not have biosecurity legislation and regulations. The biosecurity guidelines, published on the EMPHNET website in 2016, are considered standards in health licensing legislation but not a countrywide regulation. [1]

Jordan’s Bylaw No. 29, issued in 2019 in accordance with Jordan’s Public Health Law, states that a new Committee (National Committee for Biological Safety and Security) is established under the Chairmanship of the Ministry of Health, which will coordinate the national efforts of relevant stakeholders related to biological safety and security. The Bylaw, nonetheless, does not address requirements such as physical containment, operation practices, failure reporting systems, and/or cybersecurity of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed. [2]

The ‘Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’, published in September
2016, mentioned that Jordan has limited capacity for biosecurity without any reference to biosecurity legislation or regulations. [3] The Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture websites do not include information regarding biosecurity legislation or regulations. [4,5] Although Jordan submits UN Biological Weapons Convention Confidence Building Measures almost every year, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it remains unknown if the reports contain information on this regard. [6] The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database for Jordan does not include information on this matter. [7]


1.3.1c
Is there an established agency (or agencies) responsible for the enforcement of biosecurity legislation and regulations?
Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

Jordan does not have biosecurity legislation and regulations and hence, the country does not have an agency for enforcement of biosecurity. The Biorisk Management Guidelines published in 2016 by the Ministry of Health in collaboration with the Eastern Mediterranean Public Health Network, indicated that the Laboratory Directorate at the Ministry of Health is responsible for the enforcement of biosecurity guidelines but not legislation and/or regulations. [1] In 2019, Jordan also introduced its "Bylaw No. 29" which established the "National Committee for Biological Safety and Security" under the Chairmanship of the Ministry of Health to coordinate the national efforts of relevant stakeholders related to biological safety and security in accordance with its Public Health Law. The Committee will be tasked with the review of regulations and legislations relevant to biosecurity, development of biosecurity strategy and the development of biosafety memorandum of understanding. [2] Further, the 'Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan', completed in September 2016, does not mention that Jordan has an entity responsible for enforcing biosecurity regulations. [3] The websites of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture does not have information on this regard. [4,5] Jordan’s reports submitted to the UN Biological Weapons Convention Confidence Building Measures are inaccessible, and therefore it remains unknown if they include information on enforcement entities in the country. [6]
Is there public evidence that shows that the country has taken action to consolidate its inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence indicating that Jordan took action to consolidate its inventories of especially dangerous pathogens into a minimum number of facilities.

The 'National Action Plan for Combating Antimicrobial Resistance In the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2018-2022)', published on the WHO Library of National Action Plans website and the Ministry of Health website, does not include information on efforts to consolidate dangerous pathogens inventory in the country. [1,2]

Jordan’s Bylaw No. 29, issued in 2019 and in accordance with Jordan’s Public Health Law, states that a new Committee is established under the Chairmanship of the Ministry of Health, which will coordinate the national efforts of relevant stakeholders related to biological safety and security. [3] The Bylaw nonetheless, does not address actions to consolidate inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities.

The Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, completed in September 2016, does not include information regarding dangerous pathogens inventory consolidation either. [4]

The websites of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture do not include information on this matter. [5,6]

Jordan’s reports submitted to the UN Biological Weapons Convention Confidence Building Measures are inaccessible, and therefore it remains unknown if they include information on dangerous pathogens inventory consolidation. [7] The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database for Jordan does not include information on this matter. [8]


1.3.1e

Is there public evidence of in-country capacity to conduct Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)–based diagnostic testing for anthrax and/or Ebola, which would preclude culturing a live pathogen?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

Jordan is capable of conducting PCR testing and does include it for anthrax and/or Ebola diagnostic testing. With reference to the surveillance guidelines published in 2016 on the Ministry of Health website, Jordan conducts PCR testing for both Ebola and Anthrax as part of the diagnostic procedures. [1] The national AMR action plan for 2018-2022, which is publicly available on the WHO Library of National Action Plans website and the Ministry of Health website, suggests that Jordan has a limited capacity to detect emerging resistant pathogens without clarifying whether this includes Anthrax and/or Ebola. [2, 3] According to the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report for the Kingdom of Jordan, completed in September 2016, "the country is proficient in classical diagnostic techniques including bacteriology, serology and PCR in select labs", without elaborating on whether this includes PCR capacity in Anthrax and/or Ebola. [4] The website of the Ministry of Agriculture does not include information on PCR testing for anthrax and/or Ebola in Jordan. [5]


1.3.2 Biosecurity training and practices

1.3.2a

Does the country require biosecurity training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential?
Yes = 1, No = 0
Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that there is a common biorisk curriculum or train-the-trainer program for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential. Although there is evidence of trainings for biosafety and biosecurity, it remains unclear whether there is a standardized curriculum or training approach that is followed country-wide.

Biorisk training, which encompass both biosafety and biosecurity, is a requirement for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens in Jordan; The Ministry of Health "Biorisk Management Guidelines", published in 2016, mentioned that biorisk training is required for personnel working in such facilities and should be factored in in the facilities annual budget plan. Jordan has restrictions ensuring that personnel do not perform tasks for which they did not receive any training. Training records are also to be maintained in a "legible, readily identifiable and retrievable" manner. In spite of the presence of Guidelines mandating training, no reference is made to a standard approach or curriculum; rather the guidelines provide generic guidance on the content: "training should include raising personnel awareness of biorisk issues including the relevance of human factors in biorisk management." [1]

According to the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, completed in September 2016, "a training programme on biosafety and biosecurity is being implemented with common curricula at some facilities that maintain or work with dangerous pathogens and toxins." The report does not provide further information on the training content. [2]

The 'National Action Plan for Combating Antimicrobial Resistance In the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2018-2022)', which is publicly available on the websites of the WHO Library of National Action Plans website and the Ministry of Health, does not include information on biosecurity training. [3, 4]

The websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture and the General Directorate of Civil Defence do not include information regarding biosecurity training. [5, 6, 7]

Although Jordan submits UN Biological Weapons Convention Confidence Building Measures almost every year, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [8] The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database for Jordan does not include information on this matter. [9]

1.3.3 Personnel vetting: regulating access to sensitive locations

1.3.3a

Do regulations or licensing conditions specify that security and other personnel with access to especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential are subject to the following checks: drug testing, background checks, and psychological or mental fitness checks?

Personnel are subject to all three of these checks = 3, Personnel are subject to two of these checks = 2, Personnel are subject to one of these checks = 1, Personnel are not subject to any of these checks = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient publicly available evidence indicating that background checks, drug testing and psychological or mental fitness checks are included in these policies or any other licensing conditions. However, there is evidence of health checks. The Ministry of Health "Biorisk Management Guidelines", published in 2016, included a worker health policy that requires assessing the immune status of the personnel with significant risk of exposure to dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials. This includes medical background screening and periodic health checks. The guidelines emphasized that all individuals must comply with this policy and that “individuals considered unfit for work in the facility on health grounds should be identified and prevented from accessing areas where there are risks of exposure.” [1] The national AMR action plan for 2018-22, published on the WHO Library of National Action Plans website and the Ministry of Health website, does not provide information related to regulations or licensing conditions requiring checks for personnel with access to dangerous pathogens. [2,3] The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report for the Kingdom of Jordan, published in early 2017, does not include information in this regard either. [4] The websites of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture do not include information related to such regulations or licensing conditions that require checks for personnel with access to dangerous pathogens. [5,6] Jordan’s reports submitted to the UN Biological Weapons Convention Confidence Building Measures are inaccessible, and therefore it remains unknown if they include information on regulations or licensing conditions related to personnel with access to dangerous pathogens. [7]

1.3.4 Transportation security

1.3.4a
Does the country have publicly available information on national regulations on the safe and secure transport of infectious substances (specifically including Categories A and B)?
Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

Jordan does not have a publicly available evidence on regulations to guide safe and secure transport of infectious substances specifically including Categories A and B. The Ministry of Health's "Biorisk Management Guidelines", published in 2016, included requirements and regulations of transport of biological agents and toxins without mentioning any specific infectious substances including Categories A and B. [1] The websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Transport do not include information on the safe and secure transport of infectious substances including Categories A and B. [2,3,4] The Certification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) does not include information on this matter for Jordan [5] Although Jordan submits UN Biological Weapons Convention Confidence Building Measures almost every year, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [6]


1.3.5 Cross-border transfer and end-user screening

1.3.5a
Is there legislation and/or regulations in place to oversee the cross-border transfer and end-user screening of especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, and pathogens with pandemic potential?
Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence indicating that Jordan has legislation and/or regulations to oversee the cross-border transfer of dangerous pathogens or that Jordan conducts end-user screening. The Ministry of Health "Biorisk Management Guidelines 2016", published on EMPHNET, indicated that Jordan complies with international guidelines when it comes to external transport of infectious substances and follows the requirements of the International Air Transport Association and International Civil Aviation Organization. However, the guidelines do not include any information suggesting that Jordan conducts end-user screening. [1] The websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Industry and Trade do not include information related to national legislation, regulation or other guidance for cross-border
transfer and end-user screening of dangerous pathogens. [2, 3, 4] The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) website does not include information on this matter for Jordan. [5] Although Jordan submits UN Biological Weapons Convention Confidence Building Measures almost every year, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [6]


1.4 BIOSAFETY

1.4.1 Whole-of-government biosafety systems

1.4.1a
Does the country have in place national biosafety legislation and/or regulations?
Yes = 1, No = 0
Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Jordan has national biosafety legislation and/or regulations in place.

The "Biorisk Management Guidelines," published in 2016 and available on the Ministry of Health website, does not include or refer to any national biosafety legislation and/or regulations. The guidelines are merely standards for health licensing legislation but not national regulations; they are not considered laws/regulations [1]

Jordan’s Bylaw No. 29, issued in 2019 and in accordance with Jordan’s Public Health Law, states that a new Committee is established under the Chairmanship of the Ministry of Health, will coordinate the national efforts of relevant stakeholders related to biological safety and security. The Bylaw nonetheless, does not indicate that the country have in place national biosafety legislation and/or regulations. [2]

The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan stated that the country has limited capacity for biosafety and lacks biosafety legislation and regulations. [3]


The Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Environment (2017 - 2019) available on the website of the Ministry of Environment does not include any information on biosafety regulations. [6]
The websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Environment do not include information on such regulations. [7,8,9]

Although Jordan submits UN Biological Weapons Convention Confidence Building Measures almost every year, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on these regulations. [10] The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database for Jordan does not include information on this matter. [11]


1.4.1b
Is there an established agency responsible for the enforcement of biosafety legislation and regulations?
Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

Jordan does not have an agency responsible for the enforcement of biosafety legislation and regulations as it does not have such legislation and regulations in place. However, Jordan's Bylaw No. 29, issued in 2019 in accordance with Jordan's Public Health Law, states that a new Committee is established under the Chairmanship of the Ministry of Health, will coordinate the national efforts of relevant stakeholders related to biological safety and security. The Bylaw nonetheless, does not require establishing agency responsible for the enforcement of biosafety legislation and regulations.[1]

Jordan's "Biorisk Management Guidelines" published in 2016 and available on the Ministry of Health website, do not mention that Jordan has an agency responsible for the enforcement of biosafety legislation and regulations. [2]

The Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan stated that the country has limited
capacity for biosafety and lacks biosafety legislation and regulations; the document does not include information on agency responsible for enforcing biosafety regulations. [3]


The Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Environment (2017 - 2019) available on the website of the Ministry of Environment does not include any information on such agencies in Jordan. [6] The websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Environment do not include any information relevant to agency responsible for enforcing biosafety legislation. [7,8,9]

Although Jordan submits UN Biological Weapons Convention Confidence Building Measures almost every year, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information entities responsible for the enforcement of biosafety regulations in Jordan. [10] The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database for Jordan does not include information on this matter. [11]

1.4.2 Biosafety training and practices

1.4.2a

Does the country require biosafety training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Jordan requires biosafety training using a standardised, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins or biological materials with pandemic potential.

The Ministry of Health "Biorisk Management Guidelines", published in 2016, mentioned that biorisk training is required for personnel working in such facilities and should be included in the facilities annual budget plan. The document states that Jordan has restrictions ensuring that personnel only perform tasks that they were trained on. The guidelines, however, do not state that there is a common/specific curriculum or training program, but rather provide generic guidance on procedures and content. The guidelines suggest that "training should include raising personnel awareness of biorisk issues including the relevance of human factors in biorisk management."[1]

According to the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, completed in September 2016, "a training programme on biosafety and biosecurity is being implemented with common curricula at some facilities that maintain or work with dangerous pathogens and toxins."[2]

The 'National Action Plan for Combating Antimicrobial Resistance In the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2018-2022)', which is publicly available on the websites of the WHO Library of National Action Plans website and the Ministry of Health, does not include information on biosecurity training.[3, 4] Neither of the websites of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture include information regarding biosecurity training.[5,6]

The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database for Jordan does not include information on this matter. [7] Although Jordan submits UN Biological Weapons Convention Confidence Building Measures almost every year, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [8]

1.5 DUAL-USE RESEARCH AND CULTURE OF RESPONSIBLE SCIENCE

1.5.1 Oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research

1.5.1a

Is there publicly available evidence that the country has conducted an assessment to determine whether ongoing research is occurring on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence indicating that Jordan conducted an assessment to determine whether ongoing research is occurring on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or dual use research.

Jordan’s 'National Action Plan for Combating Antimicrobial Resistance In the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2018-2022)', which is publicly accessible on the World Health Organization (WHO) library of Action Plans website, and the Ministry of Health website, does not include information on Jordan conducting an assessment of ongoing dual research. [1,2]

The websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the General Directorate of Civil Defence do not include information indicating that Jordan conducts an assessment of ongoing dual research. [3,4,5]

Although Jordan submits UN Biological Weapons Convention Confidence Building Measures almost every year, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [6]

The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database for Jordan does not include information on such assessment either. [7]


1.5.1b
Is there legislation and/or regulation requiring oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?
Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence suggesting that Jordan has a national policy requiring oversight of dual-use research, such as research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins and/or pathogens with pandemic potential.

The National Action Plan for Combating Antimicrobial Resistance in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2018-2022), which is publicly accessible on the websites of the World Health Organization (WHO) library of Action Plans website, and the Ministry of Health, does not include information on national policy requiring oversight of dual-use research. [1,2]

The websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture and the General Directorate of Civil Defence do not include information on national policy on oversight of dual-use research either. [3,4,5]

Although Jordan submits UN Biological Weapons Convention Confidence Building Measures almost every year, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [6]

The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database for Jordan does not include information on such assessment either. [7]


1.5.1c
Is there an agency responsible for oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?
Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0
There is no publicly available evidence that Jordan has a national policy requiring oversight of dual-use research, such as research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins and/or pathogens with pandemic potential; there is no evidence either that Jordan has an agency responsible for oversight of research with dangerous pathogens and toxins.

The National Action Plan for Combating Antimicrobial Resistance In the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2018-2022), which is publicly available on the World Health Organisation and the Ministry of Health website, does not include information on national policy on oversight of dual-use research. [1,2]

The websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture and the General Directorate of Civil Defence do not include information on national policy on oversight of dual-use research either. [3,4,5]

Although Jordan submits UN Biological Weapons Convention Confidence Building Measures almost every year, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [6]

The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database for Jordan does not include information on such assessment either. [7]


1.5.2 Screening guidance for providers of genetic material

1.5.2a

Is there legislation and/or regulation requiring the screening of synthesized DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) against lists of known pathogens and toxins before it is sold?
Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Jordan has national legislation and/or regulations requiring the screening of synthesised DNA before selling it.

Neither the National Action Plan for Combating Antimicrobial Resistance In the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2018-2022), which is publicly available on the Ministry of Health website and the World Health Organization (WHO) library of Action Plan website, nor the The Ministry of Health "Biorisk Management Guidelines" published in 2016, include information regarding national legislation and/or regulations requiring the screening of synthesized DNA before it is sold. [1,2,3]
The websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Transport and the General Directorate of Civil Defence do not include information on this regard either. [4,5,6,7]

Jordan’s reports submitted to the UN Biological Weapons Convention Confidence Building Measures are restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information requiring screening of synthesized DNA before selling it. [8]

The Certification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) does not include information on this matter for Jordan [9]

Jordan’s Bylaw No. 29, issued in 2019 and in accordance with Jordan’s Public Health Law, states that a new Committee is established under the Chairmanship of the Ministry of Health, will coordinate the national efforts of relevant stakeholders related to biological safety and security. The Bylaw does not address screening of synthesized DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) against lists of known pathogens and toxins before it is sold. [10]


1.6 IMMUNIZATION

1.6.1 Vaccination rates

1.6.1a

Immunization rate (measles/ MCV2)

Immunization rate (measles/ MCV2), 95% or greater = 2, 80-94.9% = 1, Less than 80%, or no data = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2019
1.6.1b
Are official foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) vaccination figures for livestock publicly available through the OIE database?
Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2020

OIE WAHIS database

Category 2: Early detection and reporting for epidemics of potential international concern

2.1 LABORATORY SYSTEMS STRENGTH AND QUALITY

2.1.1 Laboratory testing for detection of priority diseases

2.1.1a
Does the national laboratory system have the capacity to conduct diagnostic tests for at least 5 of the 10 WHO-defined core tests?
Evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests and these tests are named = 2, Evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests and the tests are not named = 1, No evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests = 0

Current Year Score: 2

Jordan's national laboratory system has the capacity to conduct diagnostic tests for 5 or more of the 10 core tests. Produced in 2016, the Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan states that the country has the laboratory capacity to perform polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing for Influenza virus (flu), virus culture for poliovirus (polio), serology for HIV, microscopy for mycobacterium tuberculosis, rapid diagnostic testing for plasmodium spp. (malaria) and bacterial culture for Salmonella; in addition to other core tests such as Brucella, cholera, Ebola, hepatitis, influenza and subtypes, MERS-CoV, Rift Valley and West Nile. [1] The Ministry of Health surveillance guidelines 2016, publicly accessible on the website of the Ministry, also mention that Jordan performs surveillance of more than 5 of the 10 core tests [2]

2.1.1b

Is there a national plan, strategy or similar document for conducting testing during a public health emergency, which includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing?

Yes, there is evidence of a plan, and it includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing = 2, Yes, there is evidence of a plan, but there is insufficient evidence that it includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing = 1, No evidence of a plan = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Jordan has a national guidelines for conducting testing during public health emergency, including considerations and action plans for testing for pathogens, scaling capacity and defining goals for testing.

Jordan’s surveillance guidelines 2016, published on the website of the Ministry of Health, does not include plans and considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing. Nonetheless, it implicitly suggests that the country has national generic guidelines to perform test for novel pathogens, assess the need for scaling capacity and define goals for testing; these guidelines are framed in the document as requirements for seeking international support and announcing health emergency to the World Health Organization (WHO) without further elaboration about the details of testing. [1]

Neither the National Action Plan for Combating Antimicrobial Resistance In the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2018-2022), which is publicly available on the Ministry of Health website and the WHO library of Action Plan website, nor the 2016 Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, include information on a national plan for conducting testing during a public health emergency. [2,3,4]

The websites of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture do not include information on this regard either. [5,6]

2.1.2 Laboratory quality systems

2.1.2a

Is there a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is accredited (e.g., International Organization for Standardization [ISO] 15189:2003, U.S. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments [CLIA])?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Jordan has a national laboratory that is accredited and serves as a reference facility in the country.

The Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, states that there is one ISO 15089 accredited laboratory. However, it does not specify whether this laboratory is considered a national reference laboratory or not. [1]

The website of the Ministry of Health and the website of the Ministry of Agriculture do not include information on any laboratory deemed national reference facility. [2,3]


2.1.2b

Is there a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is subject to external quality assurance review?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that the national reference laboratory is subject to external quality assurance review.


The website of the Ministry of Health (MoH) and the website of the Ministry of Agriculture do not provide information on any laboratory deemed national reference facility, or on external quality assurance reviews for laboratories. [2,3]

The Central Public Health Laboratory in Jordan does not have an online presence.


2.2 LABORATORY SUPPLY CHAINS

2.2.1 Specimen referral and transport system

2.2.1a
Is there a nationwide specimen transport system?
Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

Jordan has a nation-wide specimen transport system. According to the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan completed in September 2016 for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, “there is a system in place to transport specimens to national laboratories from at least 80% of intermediate level/districts within the country for advanced diagnostics”. The report gives Jordan a good score (4/5 - "demonstrated capacity") for its specimen referral and transport system. [1] The surveillance guidelines produced in 2016 and published on the website of the Ministry of Health referred to a National Transportation Legislation Act that entails necessary requirements for the transport of specimens. [2]


2.2.2 Laboratory cooperation and coordination

2.2.2a
Is there a plan in place to rapidly authorize or license laboratories to supplement the capacity of the national public health laboratory system to scale-up testing during an outbreak?
Yes = 2, Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Jordan has a plan in place to rapidly authorize or license laboratories to support the capacity of the national public health laboratory system to scale-up testing during an outbreak. The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) completed in September 2016 for Jordan does not suggest that there is a plan to rapidly authorize private laboratories to support the public health system during outbreaks; the report renders “finalizing a comprehensive biosafety and biosecurity legislation that include laboratory licensing” as a priority action for the country. [1] The Ministry of Health’s Surveillance Guidelines and Biosecurity Guidelines, both produced in 2016, do not contain information on such laboratory licensing plan. [2,3] The Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture websites, in addition to the national AMR action plan for 2018-22, which is publicly available on the Ministry of Health website and the World Health Organization (WHO) library of Action Plan website, do not provide relevant information on this matter. [4,5,6,7]

2.3 REAL-TIME SURVEILLANCE AND REPORTING

2.3.1 Indicator and event-based surveillance and reporting systems

2.3.1a

Is there evidence that the country is conducting ongoing event-based surveillance and analysis for infectious disease?

Yes, there is evidence of ongoing event-based surveillance and evidence that the data is being analyzed on a daily basis = 2,
Yes, there is evidence of ongoing event-based surveillance, but no evidence that the data are being analyzed on a daily basis = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Jordan is conducting ongoing event-based surveillance and analysis for infectious disease.

The Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan that was completed in September 2016, states that the country's Integrated Disease Surveillance System performs some elements of event-based surveillance reporting, without providing more information.[1]

Jordan’s Surveillance Guidelines 2016, published by the Ministry of Health do not indicate the country conducts event-based surveillance for infectious disease. [2]

The websites of the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture do not provide information on this regard. [3,4]

2.3.1b
Is there publicly available evidence that the country reported a potential public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) to the WHO within the last two years?
Yes = 1, No = 0
Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence suggesting that Jordan reported a potential public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) to the World Health Organization (WHO) within the last two years. According to the WHO Disease Outbreak News website, Jordan did not report a PHEIC to the WHO in 2020, 2019, or 2018. [1, 2, 3] The website of the Ministry of Health website and specifically the media page of the Ministry, do not include any announcement of a potential PHEIC within the past two years. [4, 5]


2.3.2 Interoperable, interconnected, electronic real-time reporting systems

2.3.2a
Does the government operate an electronic reporting surveillance system at both the national and the sub-national level?
Yes = 1, No = 0
Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that the government of Jordan operates an electronic reporting surveillance system at the national and sub-national levels. The Joint External Evaluation report for Jordan 2016, states that Jordan has developed capacity (score 3) for “real-time surveillance system including interoperable, interconnected electronic reporting systems,” with a standard electronic form for data collection. The system, according to the same source, is operational in both public and private health entities. [1] The national AMR action plan for 2018-2022, accessible on the websites of the World Health Organization (WHO) library of National Plans and the Ministry of Health websites, does not provide information on the electronic surveillance reporting system. [2,3] The Surveillance Guidelines for Jordan 2016 published by the website of the Ministry of Health, and the website per se do not include information on this matter either. [4,5] However there is no further information on the coverage available.


2.3.2b

Does the electronic reporting surveillance system collect ongoing or real-time laboratory data?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that the country's electronic reporting surveillance system collects real-time laboratory data. The 2016 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, recommends initiating an electronic data sharing system to enable real-time exchange of data among sectors. According to the same JEE report, Jordan has a developed capacity (score 3 out of 5) for the indicator of "interoperable, interconnected, electronic real-time reporting system," which indicates that the system does not collect real-time data as of yet. [1] Neither the Surveillance Guidelines for Jordan 2016 published on the website of the Ministry of Health, nor the website per se include information on real-time surveillance reporting. [2,3]


2.4 SURVEILLANCE DATA ACCESSIBILITY AND TRANSPARENCY

2.4.1 Coverage and use of electronic health records

2.4.1a

Are electronic health records commonly in use?

Electronic health records are commonly in use = 2, Electronic health records are not commonly in use, but there is evidence they are used = 1, No evidence electronic health records are in use = 0

Current Year Score: 1
There is publicly available evidence that electronic health records are used in Jordan, but they are not common. In 2009, a non-for-profit company called Electronic Health Solutions (EHS) launched Hakeem - a national e-health program, that aims to automate the public healthcare sector through implementing a nationwide electronic health record. According to EHS website, Hakeem is already implemented in 32 public and private hospitals in addition to 105 primary clinics across the country. [1] According to Ministry of Health statistics in 2019, Jordan has 118 public and private hospitals, which in turn suggests that electronic records although used in Jordan, they are not common on a national level. [2] The Health Information System Strategic Plan for the years 2019 - 2021, published on the Ministry of Health website, states that the ministry will collaborate with Hakeem to further develop the electronic infrastructure for the health sector to include all health facilities. [3] The national AMR action plan for 2018-22, which is publicly accessible on the websites of the WHO library of Action Plans website and the Ministry of Health, states that Jordan plans to implement a national electronic health system in 2022 called One Jordanian One Health Record. Neither the action plan nor the website of the website of the ministry not further elaborate on the initiative details. [4,5,6]


### 2.4.1b

**Does the national public health system have access to electronic health records of individuals in their country?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0  

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient publicly available evidence that Jordan's public healthcare system which is provided by the Ministry of Health, have access to the digital health records of individuals in the country. According to Electronic Health Solutions (EHS) company website, Hakeem e-health program for electronic health records is so far implemented in 32 public and private hospitals (out of the country's 118 hospitals) in addition to 105 primary clinics across the country. This indicates that although not all public health facilities can access the records as of yet, part of the public health system has access already. 

[1] The Health Information System Strategic Plan for the years 2019 - 2021, published on the Ministry of Health website states that the ministry will collaborate with Hakeem to further develop the electronic infrastructure for the health sector to include all health facilities. [2] The Ministry of Health website does not include information on the electronic health records. [3]

2.4.1c
Are there data standards to ensure data is comparable (e.g., ISO standards)?
Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is publicly available evidence that Jordan adopted data standards to ensure comparability of data. According to Electronic Health Solutions (EHS) company website, Hakeem e-health program which is adopted the Health Information System Strategic Plan for the years 2019 - 2021, utilizes VistA system. VistA is an enterprise-wide information system used in the United States Department of Veterans Affairs medical system. The EHS website also states that ISO code 27001 being used by the Jordanian VistA. The Ministry of Health website does not include information on this regard.


2.4.2 Data integration between human, animal, and environmental health sectors

2.4.2a
Is there evidence of established mechanisms at the relevant ministries responsible for animal, human, and wildlife surveillance to share data (e.g., through mosquito surveillance, brucellosis surveillance)?
Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence indicating that there is a mechanism in place at relevant ministries responsible for animal, human, and wildlife surveillance to share data. The Health Information System Strategic Plan for the years 2019 - 2021, states that the SCORE results for health data technical package developed by the World Health Organization show that Jordan has limited capacity for data access and sharing. The Ministry of Health Surveillance Guidelines do not include information indicating that there is mechanism for data sharing between ministries responsible for animal, human and wildlife surveillance. The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report for Jordan completed in September 2016, does not suggest that the country has established mechanisms for data sharing across ministries responsible for animal, human, and wildlife surveillance. Neither does the national AMR action plan for 2018-22, which is publicly available on the WHO Library of National Action Plans website and the Ministry of Health website, nor a WHO report, "Monitoring Global Progress on Addressing AMR" mention information on this matter. The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) PVS evaluation reports website, does not have an OIE PVS evaluation report for Jordan that is publicly accessible, and thus does not provide information that Jordan has established data sharing mechanisms at the relevant ministries.

2.4.3 Transparency of surveillance data

2.4.3a

Does the country make de-identified health surveillance data on infectious diseases publicly available via reports (or other format) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or similar)?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

Jordan makes de-identified health surveillance data on infectious diseases publicly available via reports and other formats on government websites, nonetheless there is no publicly available evidence that surveillance data is regularly updated. The webpages of the Ministry of Health include publicly accessible de-identified data on the epidemiological situation in the country but it remains unknown if it is regularly updated. For example, statistics on COVID-19 cases are updated and published on daily basis on the website. [1] However, updates about communicable diseases aside from COVID-19 statistics are published annually. [2] The available data on communicable diseases is broken down by years and includes statistics for years before 2019, and there is no evidence of the data being published at least on a weekly basis. [3]

Neither the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report for the Kingdom of Jordan, completed in September 2016, nor the national AMR action plan for 2018-22, which is publicly available on the World Health Organisation (WHO) Library of National Action Plans website and the Ministry of Health website, provide information suggesting that Jordan has published publicly available de-identified health surveillance data on disease outbreaks. [4,5,6]

A WHO report, “Monitoring Global Progress on Addressing AMR”, do not include relevant information either. [7]

According to the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) PVS evaluation reports website, Jordan does not have an OIE PVS evaluation report that is publicly available, and thus does not provide information that Jordan has published de-identified publicly available health surveillance data on disease outbreaks. [8]
2.4.3b

Does the country make de-identified COVID-19 surveillance data (including details such as daily case count, mortality rate, etc) available via daily reports (or other formats) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, or similar)?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

Jordan makes de-identified COVID-19 surveillance data (including details such as daily case count, mortality rate, etc) available via daily reports (or other formats) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, or similar). The websites of the Ministry of Health and Pandemic Situation include publicly accessible de-identified data on the epidemiological situation in the country. Statistics on COVID-19 cases are updated and published on daily basis on the website. [1,2]


2.4.4 Ethical considerations during surveillance

2.4.4a

Is there legislation and/or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

Jordan has regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities. The Ministry of Health Patient Protection Coalition in 2016 launched the
National Charter for Patient Rights that is publicly available on their website. Of the document’s main pillars is privacy and confidentiality of patients. All information including name, ID number, date of birth and other identifiable information is deemed confidential. It also states that the patient’s disease and treatment cannot be disclosed to anyone who is not authorised by the patient per se. [1] The surveillance guidelines published in February 2016 on the website of the Ministry of Health (MoH) do not include information on patient’s privacy and confidentiality. [2]


2.4.4b
Is there legislation and/or regulations safeguarding the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities, include mention of protections from cyber attacks (e.g., ransomware)?
Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence suggesting that Jordan’s existing legislation and/or regulations on safeguarding the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals include protection from cyber-attacks. The Ministry of Health Patient Protection Coalition in 2016 launched the National Charter for Patient Rights that is publicly available on their website. Privacy and confidentiality of patients is one of the main pillars by which all information including name, ID number, date of birth and other identifiable information is kept confidential. It also states that the patient’s disease and treatment cannot be disclosed to anyone who is not authorised by the patient per se. The charter nonetheless, does not mention protection from cyber-attacks. [1] The surveillance guidelines published in February 2016 on the website of the Ministry of Health (MoH) do not include information on patient’s privacy and confidentiality. [2]


2.4.5 International data sharing

2.4.5a
Has the government made a commitment via public statements, legislation and/or a cooperative agreement to share surveillance data during a public health emergency with other countries in the region?
Yes, commitments have been made to share data for more than one disease, Yes, commitments have been made to share data only for one disease = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0
There is no publicly available evidence suggesting that Jordan made a commitment via public statements, legislation and/or a cooperative agreement to share surveillance data during a public health emergency with other countries in the region. The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report for Jordan, completed in September 2016, does not include surveillance data sharing agreement with other countries. [1] The national AMR action plan for 2018-22, publicly available on the websites of the WHO Library of National Action Plans and the Ministry of Health, does not provide information such agreement either. [2,3] The Monitoring Global Progress on Addressing AMR report by WHO, does not mention any information on government commitment or agreement to share surveillance data with other countries. [4] The website of the Ministry of Health does not, too, include information on surveillance data sharing agreement with other countries. [5]


2.5 CASE-BASED INVESTIGATION

2.5.1 Case investigation and contact tracing

2.5.1a

Is there a national system in place to provide support at the sub-national level (e.g. training, metrics standardization and/or financial resources) to conduct contact tracing in the event of a public health emergency?

Yes, there is evidence that the national government supports sub-national systems to prepare for future public health emergencies = 2, Yes, there is evidence that the national government supports sub-national systems, but only in response to active public health emergencies = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence suggesting that Jordan has a national system in place to provide support at the sub-national level (e.g. training, metrics standardization and/or financial resources) to conduct contact tracing in the event of a public health emergency. The National Emergency Response Plan 2017 - 2018 produced by the Crisis Management Directorate of the Ministry of Health, outlines the detailed procedures that the country adopts to control and contain the emergency situation. The plan touches upon contact tracing as one of the mechanisms to contain the emergency without elaborating on any sub-national level plans such as training, metrics standardization and/or financial resources, to expand the contact tracing mechanism per se. [1] The website of the Ministry of Health does not include further information on this matter. [2]

2.5.1b

Does the country provide wraparound services to enable infected people and their contacts to self-isolate or quarantine as recommended, particularly economic support (paycheck, job security) and medical attention?

Yes, both economic support and medical attention are provided = 2, Yes, but only economic support or medical attention is provided = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence suggesting that Jordan provides wraparound services to enable infected people and their contacts to self-isolate or quarantine as recommended, particularly economic support (paycheck, job security) and medical attention. According to the National Emergency Response Plan 2017-2018 produced by the Crisis Management Directorate of the Ministry of Health, the country provides isolation spaces with all the needed equipment and tools in addition to emergency vehicles to transport the infected cases to the isolation location. However, the plan does not include information about medical services being provided to those who chose to self-isolate (e.g. at home), or to those whom the health system categorizes as requiring isolation in these isolation centers. [1] The Jordanian labor law states that employees are entitled to a paid fourteen-day-sick leave with the possibility to renew entitlements depending on the case. According to the same law, patients hospitalized in one of the hospitals/isolation centers get full pay. However, the law does not specifically mention employees who might choose to self-isolate (e.g at home). [2]


2.5.1c

Does the country make de-identified data on contact tracing efforts for COVID-19 (including the percentage of new cases from identified contacts) available via daily reports (or other format) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, or similar)?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is publicly available evidence confirming that Jordan makes de-identified data on contact tracing efforts for COVID-19, including the percentage of new cases from identified contacts, on the website of the Ministry of Health. COVID-19 updates are posted on the Ministry of Health website and updated on daily basis including statistics on infected cases with contact tracing details, deaths, recovery cases in addition to other necessary updates on preventive measures to mitigate the spread of the virus. [1]

[2]
2.5.2 Point of entry management

2.5.2a

Is there a joint plan or cooperative agreement between the public health system and border control authorities to identify suspected and potential cases in international travelers and trace and quarantine their contacts in the event of a public health emergency?

Yes, plan(s)/agreement(s) are in place to prepare for future public health emergencies = 2, Yes, but plan(s)/agreement(s) are in place only in response to active public health emergencies = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that Jordan has a joint plan or cooperative agreement between the public health system and border control authorities to identify suspected and potential cases in international travelers and trace and quarantine their contacts in the event of an active public health emergency, but only in response to an ongoing emergency.

Although the National Emergency Response Plan 2017 - 2018 produced by the Crisis Management Directorate of the Ministry of Health, states that relevant stakeholders that should be involved in responding to emergencies and public health crises include border control authorities such as the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, the plan does not mention details about the stakeholders' cooperation and involvement. [1] The Ministry of Health website and its official platform for reporting on COVID-19 announced in March 2020 restrictions on borders, surveillance of the virus procedures and contact-tracing strategies as part of the national response to the pandemic. [2,3] The website of the Ministry of Interior does not include information relevant to this matter. [4] According to the Visit Jordan website, all travelers must complete a health declaration and locator form at check-in if arriving by air, obtain health/travel insurance and visit https://gateway2jordan.gov.jo to complete the required travel declaration form and obtain their personal QR code which is mandatory for boarding. This QR code will also serve as proof of vaccination for fully vaccinated travelers upon arrival and while traveling through the country. [5]


2.6 EPIDEMIOLOGY WORKFORCE

2.6.1 Applied epidemiology training program, such as the field epidemiology training program, for public health professionals and veterinarians (e.g., Field Epidemiology Training Program [FETP] and Field Epidemiology Training Program for Veterinarians [FETPV])

2.6.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?
- Applied epidemiology training program (such as FETP) is available in country
- Resources are provided by the government to send citizens to another country to participate in applied epidemiology training programs (such as FETP)

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is publicly available evidence that applied epidemiology training program, specifically FETP, is available in the country. However, there is no accessible evidence that the government provides citizens with resources to participate in epidemiology programs in other countries. The Eastern Mediterranean Public Health Network (EMPHNET) website states that Jordan established Field Epidemiology Training Programmes (FETPs) in 1988, and trainings since then are available in the country. The website, nonetheless, does not indicate that Jordan provides resources to its citizens to participate in similar trainings abroad. [1] The Joint External Evaluation report for Jordan, completed in September 2016, touched upon Jordan’s FETP without providing evidence whether the programme provides Jordanians with resources to participate in trainings in other countries. [2]


### 2.6.1b

Are the available field epidemiology training programs explicitly inclusive of animal health professionals or is there a specific animal health field epidemiology training program offered (such as FETPV)?

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no public evidence that field epidemiology training programs (FETP) in Jordan include animal health professionals. Although the Eastern Mediterranean Public Health Network (EMPHNET) website mentions that two veterinarians participated in the FETP during the influenza epidemic in 2007 indicating that the FETP in Jordan is inclusive of animal health professionals; [1] however, there is no information on the participation of animal health professionals in the recent FETP graduation ceremony held in February 2021 of the 15th and 16th cohorts. [2] The website of the Ministry of Health and the website of the Ministry of agriculture do not include information on this regard. [3, 4]

2.6.2 Epidemiology workforce capacity

2.6.2a
Is there public evidence that the country has at least 1 trained field epidemiologist per 200,000 people?
Yes = 1 , No = 0
Current Year Score: 1

2020
Completed JEE assessments; Economist Impact analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country

Category 3: Rapid response to and mitigation of the spread of an epidemic

3.1 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PLANNING

3.1.1 National public health emergency preparedness and response plan

3.1.1a
Does the country have an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential?
Evidence that there is a plan in place, and the plan is publicly available = 2, Evidence that the plan is in place, but the plan is not publicly available OR, Disease-specific plans are in place, but there is no evidence of an overarching plan = 1, No evidence that such a plan or plans are in place = 0
Current Year Score: 2

Jordan has an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place, updated in 2017 - 2018. Produced by the Crisis Management Directorate of the Ministry of Health and published on the ministry’s website, the National Emergency Response Plan 2017 - 2018 addresses planning for multiple communicable disease with epidemic and pandemic potential. The plan includes disaster management protocols in addition to mechanisms to deal with infectious diseases, epidemics and pandemics on a national level. [1]


3.1.1b
If an overarching plan is in place, has it been updated in the last 3 years?
Yes = 1 , No /no plan in place= 0
Current Year Score: 1
Jordan has an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place, updated in 2017 - 2018. Produced by the Crisis Management Directorate of the Ministry of Health and published on the ministry’s website, the National Emergency Response Plan 2017 - 2018 addresses planning for multiple communicable disease with epidemic and pandemic potential. The plan includes disaster management protocols in addition to mechanisms to deal with infectious diseases, epidemics and pandemics on a national level. [1]


3.1.1c
If an overarching plan is in place, does it include considerations for pediatric and/or other vulnerable populations?
Yes = 1, No / no plan in place = 0

Current Year Score: 1

Jordan’s overarching national public health emergency response plan includes considerations for children/infants and other vulnerable groups. The Jordan National Emergency Response Plan 2017 - 2018 produced by the Crisis Management Directorate of the Ministry of Health and published on the ministry’s website, addresses planning for health emergencies and shines light on multiple communicable disease with epidemic and pandemic potential. The plan includes action points in cases of health emergency that cover infants, children, refugees and people with chronic diseases. Action points include provision of basic services (water, nutrition, electricity, etc.) at refugee camps, vaccination for infants and children, primary health services to refugees, necessary health services to people with chronic diseases, in addition to mental health support to traumatized/affected people. [1]


3.1.1d
Does the country have a publicly available plan in place specifically for pandemic influenza preparedness that has been updated since 2009?
Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2020

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH)

3.1.2 Private sector involvement in response planning

3.1.2a
Does the country have a specific mechanism(s) for engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response?
Yes = 1, No = 0
Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Jordan involves the private sector in its mechanisms when it comes to outbreak emergency preparedness and response. Jordan National Emergency Response Plan 2017 - 2018 produced by the Crisis Management Directorate of the Ministry of Health and published on the ministry’s website, includes the private health sector as a key stakeholder although no further details of a mechanism are provided. In cases of health emergencies, private hospitals are included in the national response plan to support the country with their data, hospital beds, and medical staff. The plan, nonetheless, does not mention any agreement with the private sector in place in this regard. [1] There is no further evidence on the website of the Ministry of Health. [2]


3.1.3 Non-pharmaceutical interventions planning

3.1.3a

Does the country have a policy, plan and/or guidelines in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during an epidemic or pandemic?

Yes, a policy, plan and/or guidelines are in place for more than one disease = 2, Yes, but the policy, plan and/or guidelines exist only for one disease = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is insufficient publicly available evidence that Jordan has a policy, plan and/or guidelines in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during an epidemic or pandemic. The 'Jordan National Emergency Response Plan 2017 - 2018' was produced by the Crisis Management Directorate of the Ministry of Health and published on the ministry’s website. It includes NPIs as a response mechanism to control and contain pandemics and/or epidemics, such as the provision of isolation rooms/buildings with international specifications, provision of personal protection equipment (PPE) to the medical staff, provision of sanitizers for isolation locations, spreading awareness about the diseases and its transition prevention, and the introduction of hotlines to report cases in a timely manner. [1] It does not, however, incorporate specific criteria for the timing of the NPI implementation.

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Jordan adopted multiple strategies and protocols and introduced emergency regulations to contain the virus and prevent its spread. Among other response actions, the government introduced a COVID-19 hotline to report on cases, established online platform to communicate messages and updates about the situation and specific response regulations - such as social distancing and PPE - use in public spaces, developed application that notifies users once they're in vicinity of a diagnosed patient, and enforced quarantine regulations for infected cases and people from abroad. [2,3]

3.2 EXERCISING RESPONSE PLANS

3.2.1 Activating response plans

3.2.1a Does the country meet one of the following criteria?
- Is there evidence that the country has activated their national emergency response plan for an infectious disease outbreak in the past year?
- Is there evidence that the country has completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise (either with WHO or separately) in the past year?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 1

Jordan activated its national emergency response plan for an infectious disease outbreak in the past year, but there is no publicly available evidence that the country completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise in the past year. In response to COVID-19, Jordan activated its National Emergency Response Plan 2017 – 2018 produced by the Crisis Management Directorate of the Ministry of Health and published on the website of the ministry. [1] As per the plan, the government coordinates with relevant stakeholders including Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Armed Forces, Royal Medical Services and public and private hospitals to issue defense orders to regulate cross border movements. The government also conducts contact tracing, provides isolation/quarantine facilities in addition to other preventive measures and response procedures. [2,3] The Ministry of Health website and the Crisis Management Directorate websites do not include information indicating that the country has completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise in the past year. [4,5] Also, the World Health Organization (WHO) extranet system does not mention that Jordan completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise in the past year. [6]

[1] Ministry of Health. “The National Emergency Response Plan 2017 – 2018.” [https://www.moh.gov.jo/EchoBusV3.0/SystemAssets/Crisis/%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A6%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A8-%D8%AF%D8%AE%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%84-2020-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B1. pdf]. Accessed 11 August 2020.

3.2.1b Is there evidence that the country in the past year has identified a list of gaps and best practices in response (either through an infectious disease response or a biological-threat focused exercise) and developed a plan to improve response capabilities?
Yes, the country has developed and published a plan to improve response capacity = 2. Yes, the country has developed a plan to improve response capacity, but has not published the plan = 1. No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence indicating that Jordan has undergone an exercise to identify a list of gaps and best practices through either an after-action review (post emergency response) or a biological threat-focused IHR exercise with WHO. Neither the Ministry of Health website nor the Crisis Management Directorate website mention that Jordan has undergone an exercise to identify gaps and best practices for post emergency response and/or biological threat-focused IHR. [1,2] Both the World Health Organization (WHO) IHR portal and the WHO country profile of Jordan do not include information indicating that Jordan has undergone an after-action review or conducted a simulation exercise with the WHO after which a list of gaps and best practices were identified. [3,4]


3.2.2 Private sector engagement in exercises

3.2.2a

Is there evidence that the country in the past year has undergone a national-level biological threat-focused exercise that has included private sector representatives?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence indicating that private health sector in Jordan was involved in a national level biological threat-focused exercise in the past year, as there is no evidence that Jordan conducted such exercise in the past year. Neither the Ministry of Health website nor the Crisis Management Directorate website mention that Jordan has undergone after action reviews in the past year. [1,2] Both the World Health Organization (WHO) IHR portal and the WHO country profile of Jordan do not include information indicating that Jordan has undergone an after-action review in the past year. Accordingly, the private sector in Jordan was not involved in such after action reviews and exercises. [3,4] There is no further evidence on the WHO Simulation Exercise page. [5]


3.3 EMERGENCY RESPONSE OPERATION

3.3.1 Emergency response operation

3.3.1a

Does the country have in place an Emergency Operations Center (EOC)?
Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is publicly available evidence that Jordan has in place an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) that covers health issues. The National Emergency Response Plan 2017 - 2018 produced by the Crisis Management Directorate states that during health crises, EOC becomes operational/activated within the Ministry of Health to manage case-reporting and communication between the crisis manager and the Management Directorate. The plan includes detailed information on when and how the EOC should be operationalized including based on medical reports about certain diseases (e.g. influenza), and health crisis outbreaks. [1] The website of the Ministry of Health does not provide information on the EOC. [2]


3.3.1b

Is the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) required to conduct a drill for a public health emergency scenario at least once per year or is there evidence that they conduct a drill at least once per year?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that the Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) is required to conduct a drill at least once per year. The National Emergency Response Plan 2017 - 2018 produced by the Crisis Management Directorate does not include information suggesting that EOC is required to conduct a drill annually, or that the EOC conducts annual drills. [1] Neither the Ministry of Health website nor the Surveillance Guidelines (2016) published on the ministry’s website provide information on the Jordan’s EOC. [2, 3]


3.3.1c

Is there public evidence to show that the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) has conducted within the last year a coordinated emergency response or emergency response exercise activated within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency/scenario?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence suggesting that the Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) can conduct, or has conducted within the last year, a coordinated emergency response or emergency response exercise activated within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency/scenario.
Although the National Emergency Response Plan 2017 - 2018 produced by the Crisis Management Directorate suggests that EOC is operational through the Ministry of Health in Jordan, it does not provide information on the capacity to conduct an emergency response exercise. [2]

The Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, completed in September 2016, mentions that Jordan's EOC is not yet operational without providing further information on plans to operationalise the EOC.[3]

Both the website of the Ministry of Health website and the Surveillance Guidelines (2016) published on the ministry’s website do not provide information on the Jordan's EOC. [4,5]


3.4 LINKING PUBLIC HEALTH AND SECURITY AUTHORITIES

3.4.1 Public health and security authorities are linked for rapid response during a biological event

3.4.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?
- Is there public evidence that public health and national security authorities have carried out an exercise to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack)?
- Are there publicly available standard operating procedures, guidelines, memorandums of understanding (MOUs), or other agreements between the public health and security authorities to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack)?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that public health and national security authorities in Jordan have carried out an exercise to respond to a potential deliberate biological event. There is insufficient public evidence that Jordan has standard operating procedures and guidelines between the public health and security authorities to respond to potential deliberate biological event (bioterrorism attacks). The National Emergency Response Plan 2017 - 2018 produced by the Crisis Management Directorate includes a section that details operating procedures to deal with terrorism outbreaks including bioterrorism. According to the plan, relevant stakeholders including Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Armed
Forces, and Hospitals work together in times of crisis/emergencies to overcome the situation. The document refers to collaboration and coordination mechanisms without mentioning agreements and MOUs. Furthermore, the plan does not outline a specific role for the Ministry of Health. [1] The Ministry of Health website and the Surveillance Guidelines published in February 2016 do not provide evidence of an exercise carried out by public health and national security authorities to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack) [2,3]


3.5 RISK COMMUNICATIONS

3.5.1 Public communication

3.5.1b

Does the risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) outline how messages will reach populations and sectors with different communications needs (eg different languages, location within the country, media reach)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

Jordan has a national plan that outlines how messages will reach populations and sectors with different communications needs. The National Emergency Response Plan 2017 - 2018 produced by the Crisis Management Directorate renders developing and enhancing the communications plan/system as one of its key sub-objectives. This includes designating media spokesperson, preparing media content/messages suitable for the variant target groups, and deciding on the times of information dissemination. [1] Also, The Ministry of Health Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan, published in 2017 on the ministry’s website, includes detailed risk and communication strategy that covers how messages will reach populations and sectors with different communications needs. [2] The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report for the Kingdom of Jordan, completed in September 2016, does not provide information on how messages will reach populations and sectors with different communications needs; neither does the Ministry of Health or the national AMR action plan for 2018-22. [3,4,5]

3.5.1 Risk communication planning

3.5.1a

Does the country have in place, either in the national public health emergency response plan or in other legislation, regulation, or strategy documents, a section detailing a risk communication plan that is specifically intended for use during a public health emergency?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is publicly available evidence that Jordan has in place, in its national public health emergency response plan, a section detailing a risk communication plan that is specifically intended for use during a public health emergency. Jordan’s National Emergency Response Plan 2017–2018 includes a detailed section on response mechanism for epidemics and pandemics, outlining relevant stakeholders, coordination protocols and resources management and utilization. [1] Also, The Ministry of Health Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan, published in 2017, provides an example of the applications of the generic National Emergency Response Plan and how it could be adapted to craft an ad hoc and detailed risk and communication strategy to be used in cases of health emergency (influenza in this case). [2] The national AMR action plan for 2018-22, which is publicly available on the Ministry of Health website, does not provide information on the country’s risk communication plan; neither does the Ministry of Health website. [3,4]


3.5.1c

Does the risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) designate a specific position within the government to serve as the primary spokesperson to the public during a public health emergency?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is publicly available evidence that Jordan’s risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy used to guide national public health response) designate a specific position within the government to serve as the primary spokesperson to the public during a public health emergency.
The "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan", completed in September 2016 states that "there is a designated, trained media spokesperson in the Media Centre," although in some cases, senior officials such as the Director of the Directorate for Communicable Diseases are assigned as media spokespersons in issues falling within their area of expertise. It further states that the designated media spokespersons functions through the Directorate of Health Communication and Awareness Media Centre in the Ministry of Health (MoH). [1]

Additionally, the National Emergency Response Plan 2017 - 2018 produced by the Crisis Management Directorate, includes guidelines for developing ad hoc public health response plans in cases of emergencies; such plans contain communications strategy through which a designated media spokesperson communicates with the public on the latest updates. [2]


### 3.5.2 Public communication

#### 3.5.2a

In the past year, is there evidence that the public health system has actively shared messages via online media platforms (e.g. social media, website) to inform the public about ongoing public health concerns and/or dispel rumors, misinformation or disinformation?

Public health system regularly shares information on health concerns = 2, Public health system shares information only during active emergencies, but does not regularly utilize online media platforms = 1, Public health system does not regularly utilize online media platforms, either during emergencies or otherwise = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is publicly available evidence that Jordan’s public health system in the past year has actively shared messages via online platforms (e.g. social media, website) to inform the public about ongoing/current public health concerns and/or dispel rumors, misinformation or disinformation. The Ministry of Health in Jordan shares messages via its website, the website of the Crisis Management Directorate, and official Facebook page only during active emergencies; the Ministry nonetheless, does not regularly utilize online media platforms. Information published via these platforms include relevant updates on the public health situation, and daily case reporting in addition to dispelling rumors. [1,2] In addition to the media section on its website, the Ministry of Health’s Facebook page content suggests that the ministry actively utilizes online communications platform to inform the public on the public health situation and concerns since before the recent COVID-19 outbreak. [1,2]


#### 3.5.2b

Is there evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers) have shared misinformation or disinformation on infectious diseases in the past two years?

No = 1, Yes = 0
Current Year Score: 1

There is no publicly available evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers) have shared misinformation or disinformation on infectious diseases in the past two years. The Jordanian Ministry of Health battles fake news through publishing updates on their dedicated page on the ministry’s website, Facebook page and media press briefings. This in turn, aims at ensuring transparency and accountability, as well as dispelling misinformation/rumors. [1,2] Also, the government of Jordan through its Cyber Crime Unit stipulates criminal penalties for publishing fake news on online platforms as per the 2015 Electronic Crimes Law. [3]


3.6 ACCESS TO COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE

3.6.1 Internet users

3.6.1a Percentage of households with Internet
Input number
Current Year Score: 66.79

2019

International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

3.6.2 Mobile subscribers

3.6.2a Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants
Input number
Current Year Score: 77.0

2019

International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

3.6.3 Female access to a mobile phone

3.6.3a Percentage point gap between males and females whose home has access to a mobile phone
Input number
3.6.4 Female access to the Internet

3.6.4a Percentage point gap between males and females whose home has access to the Internet

Current Year Score: 1.0

2019

Gallup; Economist Impact calculation

3.7 TRADE AND TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS

3.7.1 Trade restrictions

3.7.1a In the past year, has the country issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of medical goods (e.g. medicines, oxygen, medical supplies, PPE) due to an infectious disease outbreak?

Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 0

There is publicly available evidence that in the past year Jordan issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of medical goods (e.g. medicines, oxygen, medical supplies, PPE) due to an infectious disease outbreak. In response to the COVID-19 outbreak and according to local news agencies, the Jordan Food and Drug Administration banned face masks exports to ensure sufficient amount of masks remain available in the local market. The sources, nonetheless, do not include evidence on whether the ban had bilateral/international support. [1,2] The websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs do not include supporting evidence either. [3,4,5]


3.7.1b In the past year, has the country issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of non-medical goods (e.g. food, textiles, etc) due to an infectious disease outbreak?

Yes = 0, No = 1
There is no publicly available evidence that Jordan issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of non-medical goods (e.g. food, textiles, etc) due to an infectious disease outbreak. According to local news agencies, import and export of non-medical goods (food, textiles, etc) remained operational even during the outbreak of COVID-19, although among other goods, food and medical supplies are prioritized. [1,2] The websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperations and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates do not include information on any issued restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of non-medical goods (e.g. food, textiles, etc) due to an infectious disease outbreak. [3,4,5,6]

3.7.2 Travel restrictions

3.7.2a

In the past year, has the country implemented a ban, without international/bilateral support, on travelers arriving from a specific country or countries due to an infectious disease outbreak?

Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 0

There is publicly available evidence that Jordan in the past year implemented a ban without international/bilateral support on travelers arriving from a specific country or countries due to an infectious disease outbreak. In response to COVID-19, Jordan issued defense orders that restrict cross border travel, to prevent the spread of the virus in the country. Borders were closed for non-Jordanian travelers since the outbreak of the pandemic; non-Jordanians were denied access to the country although they were allowed to leave. However, there is no evidence indicating whether the ban had bilateral/international support. [1,2] Jordan’s profile on the World Health Organization (WHO) website does not include information relevant to the ban implemented on travelers arriving from a specific country/countries due to an infectious disease. [3] The websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates do not include information relevant to the ban. [3,4,5]

Category 4: Sufficient and robust health sector to treat the sick and protect health workers

4.1 HEALTH CAPACITY IN CLINICS, HOSPITALS, AND COMMUNITY CARE CENTERS

4.1.1 Available human resources for the broader healthcare system

4.1.1a
Doctors per 100,000 people
Input number

Current Year Score: 232.37

2017

WHO; national sources

4.1.1b
Nurses and midwives per 100,000 people
Input number

Current Year Score: 282.12

2018

WHO; national sources

4.1.1c
Does the country have a health workforce strategy in place (which has been updated in the past five years) to identify fields where there is an insufficient workforce and strategies to address these shortcomings?
Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Jordan has a health workforce strategy in place, which has been updated in the past five years, to identify the fields where there is an insufficient workforce and strategies to address these shortcomings. The National Employment Strategy for the years 2011 - 2020, published on the Ministry of Labor, does not include information on the health workforce shortcomings or strategies to identify health fields where there is lack of labor force. [1] The websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, Ministry of Labor do not include information on the health workforce shortcomings and strategies to address them. [2,3,4,5] The Joint External Evaluation for Jordan completed in September 2016, and the National AMR Action Plan 2018-2022 available on the Ministry of Health website do not provide information suggesting that Jordan has a workforce strategy in place. [6,7]
4.1.2 Facilities capacity

4.1.2a

Hospital beds per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 147

2017

WHO/World Bank; national sources

4.1.2b

Does the country have the capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases in a biocontainment patient care unit and/or patient isolation room/unit located within the country?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

Jordan has the capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases in a biocontainment patient care unit and/or patient isolation room/unit located within the country. Large hospitals such as Jordan University Hospital, King Abdullah University Hospital and Specialty Hospital have the capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases in Jordan. According to its website, Jordan University Hospital isolates patients suspected of MERS-CoV. [1] King Abdullah University Hospital’s website mentions that the hospital has the capacity to isolate patients with infectious diseases. [2] Most recently and in response to COVID-19 outbreak, the Ministry of Health worked on preparing an isolation building in Prince Hamzah hospital and isolation rooms in Al-Bashir hospital. [3] The Minister of Health further asked the private hospitals to establish/prepare isolation rooms for suspected COVID-19 cases. [4] There is evidence the Specialty Hospital has 4 isolation rooms (positive and negative) which are designed for the infectious diseases and to control them effectively. [5]

4.1.2c

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?
- Is there evidence that the country has demonstrated capacity to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years?
- Is there evidence that the country has developed, updated or tested a plan to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is publicly available evidence suggesting that Jordan has demonstrated capacity to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years; but there is no evidence suggesting that Jordan developed, updated or tested a plan to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years. In response to COVID-19 outbreak, the Ministry of Health worked on preparing an isolation building in Prince Hamzah hospital and 12 isolation rooms in Al-Bashir hospital. Additionally, the Ministry has proactively established a field hospital in the area of Kho in the Governorate of Zarqa. [1] The Minister of Health further asked the private hospitals to establish/prepare isolation rooms for suspected COVID-19 cases. [2] However, there is no evidence of a plan to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak that had updated or tested in the past two years through the Joint External Evaluation for Jordan, published in 2016, the website of the Ministry of Health and specifically the media page. [3, 4, 5]

4.2 SUPPLY CHAIN FOR HEALTH SYSTEM AND HEALTHCARE WORKERS

4.2.1 Routine health care and laboratory system supply

4.2.1a

Is there a national procurement protocol in place which can be utilized by the Ministries of Health and Agriculture for the acquisition of laboratory supplies (e.g. equipment, reagents and media) and medical supplies (e.g. equipment, PPE) for routine needs?

Yes for both laboratory and medical supply needs = 2, Yes, but only for one = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 2

Jordan has a national procurement protocol in place which can be utilized by the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture for acquisition of laboratory needs such as equipment, reagents, and media as well as medical supplies. The Ministry of Health through its Joint Procurement Department (which is responsible for acquisition of all laboratory needs, medical equipment and medicine) produced procurement strategy for the years 2017 - 2019 to streamline procurement of medicine and medical equipment. [1] The Government Procurement Department was established under the Government Procurement System No. (28) of 2019. This Government Procurement System applies to all public entities whose finances are financed by the government. All Ministry of Health and Agriculture purchases must go through this unit. There is evidence of tenders for medicines supplies requested through that protocol. [2] The Joint External Evaluation report completed in September 2016, mentions that Jordan has a national procurement process of media and reagents of essential laboratory tests without referring to medical supplies or parties/entities responsible for national procurement. [3] The websites of the Ministries of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture do not provide information on this matter. [4, 5]


4.2.2 Stockpiling for emergencies

4.2.2a

Does the country have a stockpile of medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, medical equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is limited evidence about what the stockpile contains = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Jordan has a stockpile of medical supplies (e.g. medical countermeasures (MCMs), medicines, vaccines, medical equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency.
The National Emergency Response Plan 2017 - 2018 produced by the Crisis Management Directorate of the Ministry of Health does not indicate that stockpile of medical supplies is in place, but the plan explains that the Joint Procurement Department will be instructed to carry out ad hoc stockpiling of MCM in cases of health emergencies and purchase the needed equipment in response to health emergencies. [1]

The 2016 Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, recommends that the Ministry of Health should maintain a stockpile of emergency drugs and equipment through formal agreement with suppliers, without stating whether the stockpile currently exists or not. The same source states that a national plan of MCM personnel deployment in public health emergencies exists and needs to be updated, but there is no information suggesting that the country maintains a stockpile of MCMs. [2]

Neither National Action Plan for Combating Antimicrobial Resistance in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2018-2022) published on the website of Ministry of Health nor the website per se provide information on stockpile of medical supplies in Jordan [3,4]

The websites of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation and the General Directorate of Civil Defence do not include information on this matter. [5,6]


4.2.2b
Does the country have a stockpile of laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is limited evidence about what the stockpile contains = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Jordan has a stockpile of laboratory supplies such as reagents and media, for national use during a public health emergency.

The National Emergency Response Plan 2017 - 2018 produced by the Crisis Management Directorate of the Ministry of Health does not indicate that stockpile of laboratory equipment is in place for national use in cases of health emergencies. [1]

The 2016 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, recommends that the
Ministry of Health should maintain a stockpile of emergency drugs and equipment through formal agreement with suppliers, without stating whether the stockpile currently exists or not. Also, the report states that a national plan of medical countermeasures (MCMs) personnel deployment in public health emergencies exists and needs to be updated, but there is no information suggesting that the country maintains a stockpile of MCMs. The JEE, however, does not provide information on stockpile of laboratory equipment in the country. [2]

Jordan’s national AMR action plan (2018-22) published on the website of Ministry of Health, and the website of the Ministry of Health itself do not provide information in this regard. [3,4]

Neither the website of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation nor the website of the General Directorate of Civil Defense do not include information on this matter. [5,6]


4.2.2c
Is there evidence that the country conducts or requires an annual review of the national stockpile to ensure the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is publicly available evidence suggesting that Jordan conducts or requires an annual review of the national stockpile to ensure the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency.

The National Emergency Response Plan 2017 - 2018 produced by the Crisis Management Directorate of the Ministry of Health does not indicate that stockpile of medical supplies is in place, but the plan explains that the Joint Procurement Department will be instructed to carry out ad hoc stockpiling of MCM in cases of health emergencies and purchase the needed equipment in response to health emergencies. [1] The plan does not indicate that stockpile of laboratory equipment is in place for national use in cases of health emergencies. [1] Accordingly, there is no indication of annual review of the national stockpile to ensure the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency.

The 2016 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, recommends that the Ministry of Health should maintain a stockpile of emergency drugs and equipment through formal agreement with suppliers, without stating whether the stockpile currently exists or not. Also, the report states that a national plan of medical
countermeasures (MCMs) personnel deployment in public health emergencies exists and needs to be updated, but there is no information suggesting that the country maintains a stockpile of MCMs. The JEE, however, does not provide information on stockpile of laboratory equipment in the country, neither does it provide information relevant to annual review of stockpiles to ensure the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency. [2]

Jordan’s national AMR action plan (2018-22) published on the website of Ministry of Health, and the website of the Ministry of Health itself do not provide information in this regard. [3,4]

Neither the website of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation nor the website of the General Directorate of Civil Defense do not include information on this matter. [5,6]


4.2.3 Manufacturing and procurement for emergencies

4.2.3a Does the country meet one of the following criteria?
- Is there evidence of a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?
- Is there evidence of a plan/mechanism to procure medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0
Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Jordan has in place a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce medical supplies (e.g. medical countermeasures (MCMs), medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency; also, there is insufficient evidence of a plan/mechanism to procure medical supplies for national use during a public health emergency.

The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report for Jordan, completed in September 2016, mentions that the country has a self-procurement mechanism that includes vaccines for both the private and the public sectors. The report, however, neither elaborate on how this is implemented/leveraged specifically during public health emergencies nor provides information of the local MCMs production capacity. [1] Jordan’s national AMR action plan for 2018-22 available on the ministry of Health website and the website itself do not include information on MCMs supplies production or procurement during health emergencies.
The Jordan Chamber of Industry website do not provide information on a plan or mechanism for domestic manufacturing capacity or procurement during public health emergency. [4] The websites of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation and the General Directorate of Civil Defense do not include information on these matters. [5, 6]


4.2.3b
Does the country meet one of the following criteria?
- Is there evidence of a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?
- Is there evidence of a plan/mechanism to procure laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Jordan has a national plan to procure and produce laboratory supplies such as reagents and media for national use, neither there is public evidence suggesting that the country has a mechanism in place to leverage local manufacturing of laboratory supplies during health emergencies.

The Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan completed in September 2016 states that "there is national production/procurement of necessary media and reagents for performance of core laboratory tests." However, the report neither specifies the supplies nor elaborates on how this is implemented/leveraged specifically during public health emergencies. [1]

Jordan’s National Action Plan for Combating Antimicrobial Resistance In the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2018-2022) available on the ministry of Health website and the website itself do not include information on laboratory supplies production or procurement during health emergencies. [2,3]

4.3 MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES AND PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT

4.3.1 System for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCM) during a public health emergency

4.3.1a

Does the country have a plan, program, or guidelines in place for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCM) for national use during a public health emergency (i.e., antibiotics, vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Jordan has existing plan, programme or guidelines for dispensing medical countermeasures for national use during public health emergencies.

The Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan completed in 2016 and the national AMR action plan (2016) published on the Ministry of Health website do not provide information on programmes or guidelines for dispensing medical countermeasures to be utilized on a national level during health outbreaks. [1,2] The websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation and the General Directorate of Civil Defence do not include information on this matter. [3,4,5]


4.3.2 System for receiving foreign health personnel during a public health emergency

4.3.2a

Is there a public plan in place to receive health personnel from other countries to respond to a public health emergency?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that Jordan has a plan in place to receive health personnel from other countries to respond to public health emergencies. Jordan has a bilateral agreement with Austria on providing mutual aid in case of emergencies. Although health emergencies are not specified, the agreement covers emergencies more broadly and includes provision of medical aid. Among other procedures to facilitate response logistics, the agreement allows for visa free travel by the medical teams and
facilitation for the import and export of emergency supplies needed by response teams for the sake of emergency response. [1] However, there is limited evidence of a plan to facilitate the arrival of health personnel that would apply more broadly. The Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan completed in 2016, there is a system in Jordan for sending and receiving health personnel during health emergencies. The report, nonetheless, does not elaborate on how the system works or if there are agreements in place to streamline the process. [2] The websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation and the General Directorate of Civil Defence do not provide further information on this matter. [3,4, 5]


4.4 HEALTHCARE ACCESS

4.4.1 Access to healthcare

4.4.1a Does the constitution explicitly guarantee citizens’ right to medical care?
Guaranteed free = 4, Guaranteed right = 3, Aspirational or subject to progressive realization = 2, Guaranteed for some groups, not universally = 1, No specific provision = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2020

World Policy Analysis Center

4.4.1b Access to skilled birth attendants (% of population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 99.7

2018

4.4.1c
Out-of-pocket health expenditures per capita, purchasing power parity (PPP; current international $)
Input number
Current Year Score: 230.23

2017

WHO Global Health Expenditure database

4.4.2 Paid medical leave

4.4.2a
Are workers guaranteed paid sick leave?
Paid sick leave = 2, Unpaid sick leave = 1, No sick leave = 0
Current Year Score: 2

2020

World Policy Analysis Center

4.4.3 Healthcare worker access to healthcare

4.4.3a
Has the government issued legislation, a policy, or a public statement committing to provide prioritized healthcare services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency?
Yes = 1, No = 0
Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that the government of Jordan issued legislation, a policy, or a public statement committing to provide prioritized healthcare services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of public health emergency. The National Emergency Response Plan 2017 - 2018 produced by the Crisis Management Directorate of the Ministry of Health, and the website of the Ministry of Heath do not include information on prioritized healthcare services to health workers who become sick during health outbreaks. [1,2]

4.5 COMMUNICATIONS WITH HEALTHCARE WORKERS DURING A PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY

4.5.1 Communication with healthcare workers

4.5.1a Is there a system in place for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency?
Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Jordan has a system in place for public health officials and workers to communicate during public health emergencies. Neither the National Emergency Response Plan 2017-2018 produced by the Crisis Management Directorate of the Ministry of Health, nor does the website of the Ministry of Health provide information on such communications system. [1,2]


4.5.1b Does the system for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during an emergency encompass healthcare workers in both the public and private sector?
Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that there is a system for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during an emergency neither with healthcare workers in the public nor in the private healthcare sectors. Neither the National Emergency Response Plan 2017-2018 nor the website of the Ministry of Health provide information on this matter. [1,2]

4.6 INFECTION CONTROL PRACTICES AND AVAILABILITY OF EQUIPMENT

4.6.1 Healthcare associated infection (HCAI) prevention and control programs

4.6.1a
Is there evidence that the national public health system is monitoring for and tracking the number of healthcare associated infections (HCAI) that take place in healthcare facilities?
Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is publicly available evidence that Jordan’s public health system monitors and tracks the number of healthcare associated infections (HCAI) that take place in healthcare facilities. According to Jordan’s AMR national action plan 2018-2022, the country established an AMR HCAI monitoring system in eight locations only (i.e. not on a national level). [1] The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report for Jordan completed in September 2016 nonetheless mentions that the country has programmes for monitoring, preventing and controlling healthcare associated infections, although limited to specific tertiary care and university hospitals. [2]


4.7 CAPACITY TO TEST AND APPROVE NEW MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES

4.7.1 Regulatory process for conducting clinical trials of unregistered interventions

4.7.1a
Is there a national requirement for ethical review (e.g., from an ethics committee or via Institutional Review Board approval) before beginning a clinical trial?
Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is publicly available evidence that Jordan has national requirements for ethical review (e.g., from an ethics committee or via Review Board approval) before beginning a clinical trial. A research work published on Research Gate website in 2017, mentions that ethical approvals are required both on the institutional and national levels in Jordan. According to the same source, approval processes take between 4 to 8 months to complete. [1] Another paper published by the Jordan Food & Drug Administration (JFDA) in December 2014, states that "Jordan does not use a central ethics committee; only Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)/ethics committees based within individual institutions are used. Each licensed clinical site must have such a body, which should be approved by the JFDA. According to Jordanian law, the board/committee should consist of at
least five members from both sexes with sufficient experience and competency." [2] However, the website of the Ministry of Health does not include information on national requirement for ethical review before beginning a clinical trial. [3]


4.7.1b
Is there an expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures (MCM) to treat ongoing epidemics?
Yes = 1, No = 0
Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that there is an expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures (MCM) to treat ongoing epidemics. A research paper published in 2009 on clinical trials ethics in Jordan does not include any information about an expedited process for approving clinical trials. [1] A research conducted in 2017 and publicly available on the Research Gate website, discusses ethical reviews on clinical trials in Jordan and suggests that ethical approvals require between 4 to 8 months to complete without mentioning that there are expedited processes in place. [2] The Ministry of Health website does not provide information on an expedited process for approving clinical trials. [3]


4.7.2 Regulatory process for approving medical countermeasures

4.7.2a
Is there a government agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures (MCM) for humans?
Yes = 1, No = 0
Current Year Score: 1

There is publicly available evidence that Jordan has an agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures (MCM) for Humans. According to the Jordan Food & Drug Administration (JFDA) website, the Directorate of Medicine is responsible for approving the safety, quality and effectiveness of both the imported and locally produced medicines. The Directorate is further responsible for monitoring clinical testing and ensuring compliance with the clinical research law (no. 67). [1] The website of the Ministry of Health does not provide information relevant to this matter. [2]
4.7.2b

Is there an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures (MCM) for human use during public health emergencies?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Jordan has an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures (MCM) for human use during public health emergencies. The website of the Jordan Food & Drug Administration (JFDA) does not include information indicating that there are expedited processes for approving medical countermeasures. [1] The Ministry of Health website does not include information on this regard, either. [2]


Category 5: Commitments to improving national capacity, financing plans to address gaps, and adhering to global norms

5.1 INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (IHR) REPORTING COMPLIANCE AND DISASTER RISK REDUCTION

5.1.1 Official IHR reporting

5.1.1a

Has the country submitted IHR reports to the WHO for the previous calendar year?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2020

World Health Organization
5.1.2 Integration of health into disaster risk reduction

5.1.2a
Are epidemics and pandemics integrated into the national risk reduction strategy or is there a standalone national disaster risk reduction strategy for epidemics and pandemics?
Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is publicly available evidence that Jordan has a risk reduction plan that covers epidemics and pandemics. The National Emergency Response Plan 2017 - 2018 published on the Ministry of Health website, puts forward procedures for ensuring protection and prevention of pandemics and epidemics through risk mitigation planning. Risk mitigation includes defining potential health risks and assessing the ability of the country’s health system to respond to them. [1] The website of the Ministry of Health does not include information relevant to risk mitigation for epidemics and pandemics. [2]


5.2 CROSS-BORDER AGREEMENTS ON PUBLIC HEALTH AND ANIMAL HEALTH EMERGENCY RESPONSE

5.2.1 Cross-border agreements

5.2.1a
Does the country have cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to public health emergencies?
Yes = 2, Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence suggesting that Jordan has cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries or as part of a regional group with regards to public health emergencies. The websites of the Ministry of Health, the Crisis Management Directorate and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs do not include information about agreements signed with other countries regarding public health emergencies. [1,2,3]


5.2.1b
Does the country have cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to animal health emergencies?
Yes = 2, Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0
There is no publicly available evidence that Jordan has cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to animal health emergencies. There websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs do not include information about agreements signed with other countries regarding animal health emergencies. [1,2,3]


5.3 INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS

5.3.1 Participation in international agreements

5.3.1a
Does the county have signatory and ratification (or same legal effect) status to the Biological Weapons Convention?
Signed and ratified (or action having the same legal effect) = 2, Signed = 1, Non-compliant or not a member = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

5.3.1b
Has the country submitted confidence building measures for the Biological Weapons Convention in the past three years?
Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

5.3.1c
Has the state provided the required United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 report to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (1540 Committee)?
Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Biological Weapons Convention
5.3.1d
Extent of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 implementation related to legal frameworks and enforcement for countering biological weapons:

Very good (60+ points) = 4, Good (45–59 points) = 3, Moderate (30–44 points) = 2, Weak (15–29 points) = 1, Very weak (0–14 points) or no matrix exists/country is not party to the BWC = 0

Current Year Score: 3

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

5.3.2 Voluntary memberships

5.3.2a
Does the country meet at least 2 of the following criteria?
- Membership in Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA)
- Membership in the Alliance for Country Assessments for Global Health Security and IHR Implementation (JEE Alliance)
- Membership in the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP)
- Membership in the Australia Group (AG)
- Membership in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

Needs to meet at least two of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. Yes for five = 1, Yes for four = 1, Yes for three = 1, Yes for two = 1, Yes for one = 0, No for all = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Global Health Security Agenda; JE Alliance; Global Partnership; Australia Group; PSI

5.4 JOINT EXTERNAL EVALUATION (JEE) AND PERFORMANCE OF VETERINARY SERVICES PATHWAY (PVS)

5.4.1 Completion and publication of a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) assessment and gap analysis

5.4.1a
Has the country completed a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) or precursor external evaluation (e.g., GHSA pilot external assessment) and published a full public report in the last five years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda
5.4.1b
Has the country completed and published, within the last five years, either a National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS) to address gaps identified through the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) assessment or a national GHSA roadmap that sets milestones for achieving each of the GHSA targets?
Yes = 1, No = 0

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

5.4.2 Completion and publication of a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment and gap analysis

5.4.2a
Has the country completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment in the last five years?
Yes = 1, No = 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

5.4.2b
Has the country completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) gap analysis in the last five years?
Yes = 1, No = 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

5.5 FINANCING

5.5.1 National financing for epidemic preparedness

5.5.1a
Is there evidence that the country has allocated national funds to improve capacity to address epidemic threats within the past three years?
Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Jordan has allocated national funds to address epidemic threats within the past three years.
The websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of Jordan do not include information suggesting that Jordan in the past three years committed funding from the national budget to improve capacity for future epidemic threats. [1,2,3]

Neither the website of the Prime Ministry of Jordan nor the website of the Ministry of Finance include information on this matter. [4,5]


5.5.2 Financing under Joint External Evaluation (JEE) and Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) reports and gap analyses

5.5.2a
Does the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report, National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS), and/or national GHSA roadmap allocate or describe specific funding from the national budget (covering a time-period either in the future or within the past five years) to address the identified gaps?
Yes = 1, No/country has not conducted a JEE = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

5.5.2b
Does the Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) gap analysis and/or PVS assessment allocate or describe specific funding from the national budget (covering a time-period either in the future or within the past five years) to address the identified gaps?
Yes = 1, No/country has not conducted a PVS = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

5.5.3 Financing for emergency response

5.5.3a
Is there a publicly identified special emergency public financing mechanism and funds which the country can access in the face of a public health emergency (such as through a dedicated national reserve fund, an established agreement with the
World Bank pandemic financing facility/other multilateral emergency funding mechanism, or other pathway identified through a public health or state of emergency act)?
Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Jordan has access to public financing mechanisms in cases of public health emergencies. The website of the International Development Association (IDA) does not include Jordan in the list of countries eligible for their fund and hence, the country does not have access for the World Bank Pandemic Financing Facility. [1,2] The Ministry of Health website and the Crisis Management Directorate website do not include information access to emergency funds for public health emergencies. [3,4]


5.5.4 Accountability for commitments made at the international stage for addressing epidemic threats

5.5.4a

Is there evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers), in the past three years, have made a public commitment either to:
- Support other countries to improve capacity to address epidemic threats by providing financing or support?
- Improve the country’s domestic capacity to address epidemic threats by expanding financing or requesting support to improve capacity?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Jordan's senior leaders (the president or ministers) have made a public commitment in the past three years either to support other countries to improve capacity to address epidemic threats by providing financing or support. There is no evidence, either, that senior leaders made public commitments to improve the country's own domestic capacity to address epidemic threats by expanding financing or requesting support to improve capacity.

While the World Health Organization (WHO) provides technical support to the Ministry of Health including crafting health policies and strategies, however, the support does not include any financial aid provided to the country for improving capacity to address epidemics status. [1]

The Georgetown Infectious Disease Atlas (GiDA) Global Health Security Tracking dashboard states that Jordan between the years 2014 and 2020 received and continue to receive financial aid with most of the fund going to emergency response operations, national legislation and zoonotic disease. The dashboard does not mention that Jordan is using any of the fund for improving the capacity to address epidemic threats. [2]

The UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs Jordan Humanitarian Fund Annual Report for 2017 states that, US$2.3m of the US$10m total contributions provided for Jordan was allocated to improving health. However, the report does
not mention whether aid will be used to improve capacity to address epidemic threats or not. [3]

The Ministry of Health 2016-20 budget announcement does not suggest that Jordan has designated financing to address epidemic threats. [4]

A report by the Center for Disease Control (CDC) on Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) for Jordan states that Jordan is one of the countries targeted by GHSA investment and implementation without providing details on whether Jordan is committed to supporting other countries or has expanded financing to address epidemic threats. [5]

The website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates does not include information in this matter. [6]


5.5.4b

Is there evidence that the country has, in the past three years, either:
- Provided other countries with financing or technical support to improve capacity to address epidemic threats?
- Requested financing or technical support from donors to improve the country’s domestic capacity to address epidemic threats?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Jordan requested finances and technical support to improve the country’s local capacity to address epidemic threats; neither there is evidence that Jordan provided financing or technical support to other countries to improve capacity of addressingepidemic threats in the past three years. While the World Health Organization (WHO) provides technical support to the Ministry of Health on crafting health policies and strategies, however, there is no publicly available evidence explicitly suggesting that the provided programs include improving Jordan’s capacity to address epidemics status. [1]

The Georgetown Infectious Disease Atlas (GIDA) Global Health Security Tracking dashboard states that Jordan between the years 2014 and 2020 received and continue to receive financial aid with most of the fund going to emergency response operations, national legislation and zoonotic disease. However, funding included in the tracker is from over three years prior. [2] Additionally, the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs Jordan Humanitarian Fund Annual Report for 2017 states that, US$2.3m of the US$10m total contributions provided for Jordan was allocated to improving health.
However, the report does not mention whether aid will be used to improve capacity to address epidemic threats or not. [3]

A report by the Center for Disease Control (CDC) on Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) for Jordan mentions Jordan is one of the countries targeted by GHSA investment and implementation without providing details on whether Jordan is committed to supporting other countries or has expanded financing to address epidemic threats. [4]

The Ministry of Health 2016-20 budget announcement does not suggest that Jordan has designated financing to address epidemic threats, neither does it mention that Jordan provides support to other countries to improve their domestic capacity to address epidemic risks. [5]

The website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates does not include information in this matter. [6]


5.5.4c
Is there evidence that the country has fulfilled its full contribution to the WHO within the past two years?
Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Economist Impact analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country
5.6 COMMITMENT TO SHARING OF GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL DATA AND SPECIMENS

5.6.1 Commitment to sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) in both emergency and nonemergency research

5.6.1a

Is there a publicly available plan or policy for sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) along with the associated epidemiological data with international organizations and/or other countries that goes beyond influenza?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence indicating that Jordan has a plan or policy in place for sharing genetic data and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) along with the associated epidemiological data with international organizations and/or other countries that goes beyond influenza. Both the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report for Jordan completed in September 2016 and Jordan’s national AMR action plan (2018-22) published on the websites of the World Health Organization (WHO) Library of National Action Plans and the Ministry of Health AMR, do not include information suggesting that the country has a policy or plan in place for sharing genetic data and/or isolated specimens with international organization or other countries. [1,2,3] The websites of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture do not include information on this matter, either. [4,5] The Country Report on the State of Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, published on the WHO website in 2007, do not mention that Jordan has policies of genetic data sharing with international organizations or other countries. [6] A search in media outlets in both Arabic and English did not yield relevant studies or articles. [7,8,9]

5.6.1b
Is there public evidence that the country has not shared samples in accordance with the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) framework in the past two years?
Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 1

There is no publicly available evidence that Jordan has not shared samples in accordance with the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) framework in the past two years. Neither Jordan’s country profile on the website of the World Health Organization (WHO), nor recent publications/announcements on the same website include information suggesting that Jordan has not shared such samples. [1,2] The Ministry of Health website does not include information relevant to this matter. [3]


5.6.1c
Is there public evidence that the country has not shared pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak in the past two years?
Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 1

There is no publicly available evidence that Jordan has not shared pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak in the past two years. Neither Jordan’s country profile on the website of the World Health Organization (WHO), nor recent publications/announcements on the same website include information suggesting that Jordan has not shared such samples. [1,2] The Ministry of Health website does not include information relevant to this matter. [3] There is no evidence available in local media outlets, namely Jordan Times, Roya News and Al-Mamlaka, that there has been any lack of sample sharing during an outbreak in the past two years. [4,5,6]

Category 6: Overall risk environment and vulnerability to biological threats

6.1 POLITICAL AND SECURITY RISK

6.1.1 Government effectiveness

6.1.1a
Policy formation (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)
Input number
  Current Year Score: 2

2020
Economist Intelligence

6.1.1b
Quality of bureaucracy (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)
Input number
  Current Year Score: 2

2020
Economist Intelligence

6.1.1c
Excessive bureaucracy/red tape (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)
Input number
  Current Year Score: 2

2020
Economist Intelligence

6.1.1d
Vested interests/cronyism (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)
Input number
  Current Year Score: 1

2020
Economist Intelligence
6.1.1e
Country score on Corruption Perception Index (0-100, where 100=best)
Input number

Current Year Score: 49

2020
Transparency International

6.1.1f
Accountability of public officials (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)
Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2020
Economist Intelligence

6.1.1g
Human rights risk (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)
Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2020
Economist Intelligence

6.1.2 Orderly transfers of power

6.1.2a
How clear, established, and accepted are constitutional mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power from one government to another?

Very clear, established and accepted = 4, Clear, established and accepted = 3, One of the three criteria (clear, established, accepted) is missing = 2, Two of the three criteria (clear, established, accepted) are missing = 1, Not clear, not established, not accepted = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021
Economist Intelligence
6.1.3 Risk of social unrest

6.1.3a
What is the risk of disruptive social unrest?
Very low: Social unrest is very unlikely = 4, Low: There is some prospect of social unrest, but disruption would be very limited = 3, Moderate: There is a considerable chance of social unrest, but disruption would be limited = 2, High: Major social unrest is likely, and would cause considerable disruption = 1, Very high: Large-scale social unrest on such a level as to seriously challenge government control of the country is very likely = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.4 Illicit activities by non-state actors

6.1.4a
How likely is it that domestic or foreign terrorists will attack with a frequency or severity that causes substantial disruption?
No threat = 4, Low threat = 3, Moderate threat = 2, High threat = 1, Very high threat = 0

Current Year Score: 3

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.4b
What is the level of illicit arms flows within the country?
4 = Very high, 3 = High, 2 = Moderate, 1 = Low, 0 = Very low

Current Year Score: 0

2020

UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

6.1.4c
How high is the risk of organized criminal activity to the government or businesses in the country?
Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence
6.1.5 Armed conflict

6.1.5a
Is this country presently subject to an armed conflict, or is there at least a moderate risk of such conflict in the future?
No armed conflict exists = 4, Yes; sporadic conflict = 3, Yes; incursional conflict = 2, Yes, low-level insurgency = 1, Yes; territorial conflict = 0

Current Year Score: 3

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.6 Government territorial control

6.1.6a
Does the government’s authority extend over the full territory of the country?
Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.7 International tensions

6.1.7a
Is there a threat that international disputes/tensions could have a negative effect?
No threat = 4, Low threat = 3, Moderate threat = 2, High threat = 1, Very high threat = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.2 SOCIO-ECONOMIC RESILIENCE

6.2.1 Literacy

6.2.1a
Adult literacy rate, population 15+ years, both sexes (%)
Input number

Current Year Score: 98.23

2018
6.2.2 Gender equality

6.2.2a
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Gender Inequality Index score
Input number

Current Year Score: 0.53

2018

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); The Economist Intelligence Unit

6.2.3 Social inclusion

6.2.3a
Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population)
Input number

Current Year Score: 0

2010

World Bank; Economist Impact

6.2.3b
Share of employment in the informal sector
Greater than 50% = 2, Between 25-50% = 1, Less than 25% = 0

Current Year Score: 1

According to an International Labour Organization (ILO) report, published in 2020, informal employment amongst Jordanians is 35 per cent; the report also states that informal employment among Syrian refugees in Jordan is 52 per cent. The overall informal employment in the country, including both groups is reported to be 39 per cent. [1]

A press release in April 2015 on the website of ILO, more than 50% of Jordan's overall employment is informal without including a specific percentage. [2] A previous report published in 2010 on a website managed by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation called Inform, states that informal employments represented 44% of Jordan's total employment. [3]

6.2.3c
Coverage of social insurance programs (% of population)
Scored in quartiles (0-3, where 3=best)
Current Year Score: 2

2016, or latest available

World Bank; Economist Impact calculations

6.2.4 Public confidence in government
6.2.4a
Level of confidence in public institutions
Input number
Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence Democracy Index

6.2.5 Local media and reporting
6.2.5a
Is media coverage robust? Is there open and free discussion of public issues, with a reasonable diversity of opinions?
Input number
Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence Democracy Index

6.2.6 Inequality
6.2.6a
Gini coefficient
Scored 0-1, where 0=best
Current Year Score: 0.34

Latest available.
6.3 INFRASTRUCTURE ADEQUACY

6.3.1 Adequacy of road network

6.3.1a
What is the risk that the road network will prove inadequate to meet needs?
Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0
Current Year Score: 2

2021
Economist Intelligence

6.3.2 Adequacy of airports

6.3.2a
What is the risk that air transport will prove inadequate to meet needs?
Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0
Current Year Score: 3

2021
Economist Intelligence

6.3.3 Adequacy of power network

6.3.3a
What is the risk that power shortages could be disruptive?
Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0
Current Year Score: 2

2021
Economist Intelligence

6.4 ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS

6.4.1 Urbanization

6.4.1a
Urban population (% of total population)
Input number
Current Year Score: 91.2

2019

World Bank

6.4.2 Land use

6.4.2a
Percentage point change in forest area between 2006–2016
Input number

Current Year Score: -0.01

2008-2018

World Bank; Economist Impact

6.4.3 Natural disaster risk

6.4.3a
What is the risk that the economy will suffer a major disruption owing to a natural disaster?
Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 3

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.5 PUBLIC HEALTH VULNERABILITIES

6.5.1 Access to quality healthcare

6.5.1a
Total life expectancy (years)
Input number

Current Year Score: 74.41

2018

United Nations; World Bank, UNICEF; Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME); Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook

6.5.1b
Age-standardized NCD mortality rate (per 100 000 population)
6.5.1c
Population ages 65 and above (% of total population)
Input number
Current Year Score: 3.89
2019
World Bank

6.5.1d
Prevalence of current tobacco use (% of adults)
Input number
Current Year Score: 21.05
2018
World Bank

6.5.1e
Prevalence of obesity among adults
Input number
Current Year Score: 35.5
2016
WHO

6.5.2 Access to potable water and sanitation

6.5.2a
Percentage of homes with access to at least basic water infrastructure
Input number
Current Year Score: 98.94
2017
6.5.2b
Percentage of homes with access to at least basic sanitation facilities
Input number
Current Year Score: 97.34

2017

UNICEF; Economist Impact

6.5.3 Public healthcare spending levels per capita
6.5.3a
Domestic general government health expenditure per capita, PPP (current international $)
Input number
Current Year Score: 362.8

2018

WHO Global Health Expenditure database

6.5.4 Trust in medical and health advice
6.5.4a
Trust medical and health advice from the government
Share of population that trust medical and health advice from the government, More than 80% = 2, Between 60-80%, or no data available = 1, Less than 60% = 0
Current Year Score: 1

2018

Wellcome Trust Global Monitor 2018

6.5.4b
Trust medical and health advice from medical workers
Share of population that trust medical and health advice from health professionals, More than 80% = 2, Between 60-80%, or no data available = 1, Less than 60% = 0
Current Year Score: 2

2018